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ABSTRACT
Karen Musalo, a leading asylum attorney, explains, “In the United States, few refugee issues have
been as controversial as that of gender asylum.” Despite perceived progress, inconsistent judicial
decisions engender doubts about the viability of gender-based asylum cases. The U.S. courts
continue to see violence against women as a personal or family matter rather than a pattern of
accepted social behavior supported by the political and legal authorities. Using cases from
Guatemalan women seeking asylum, my research scrutinizes the asylum system, and shows how
the U.S. furthers a colonial, paternalistic narrative—allowing U.S. judges, adjudicators, and
policymakers to decide who is worthy—or not worthy—of U.S. protection. The asylum system
interacts with an embedded structure of power that disregards the impact of the historical
relationship between the U.S. and Guatemala. Using a textual study of specific case documents,
this paper analyzes the experience, ability, and process of seeking asylum as a method for
examining the legacies of paternalism. In asylum cases, adjudicators can make decisions based on
their own bias against a woman’s testimony. Judges can require women to reshape their experience
to meet the provisions of the law and make rulings that deemphasize the experience of violence.
My specific study of Guatemalan women seeking asylum shows how factual distortions,
institutionalized prejudice, and misogyny impact the asylum process.
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INTRODUCTION
Inconsistencies in United States asylum decisions are not new, but the recent hyperpoliticization of immigration policy has elevated the stakes. President Donald Trump is
unabashedly anti-immigrant and has referred to immigrants as “criminals” and even “animals.”1
President Trump has insisted to the American public and to the international community that the
asylum system is a “loophole.”2 To defend his perspective, he cites policies which allow
unauthorized immigrants to be “caught and released” into the United States. In his election
campaign, President Trump articulated plans to reduce immigration. The rallying cry of “Build
the Wall!” saturated national and international media. Though the Trumpian shibboleth remains
incomplete, the Administration has successfully constructed daunting boundaries to limit
migration.
In his first days in office, President Trump issued the “Muslim Ban” (Executive Order
13769), which suspended refugee admissions from an idiosyncratic list of countries where
Muslims reside; the list included Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The final
order that survived legal challenge decreased the number of refugees accepted into the United
States during Fiscal Year 2017 by about 50%.3 The Trump Administration also enhanced
regulations for establishing credibility during the initial asylum interview. Increasing these
restrictions has placed severe limits on the ability of asylum seekers to navigate the adjudication
process.4 In May 2018, Attorney General Sessions announced the “Zero Tolerance Policy” for

1

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants ‘Animals’ in Rant,” The New York Times
(2018).
2
Miriam Jordan, “A Day After It Was Filed, New Trump Asylum Policy Gets Hit in Court,” The New York Times
(2019).
3
United States Office of the President, Executive Order 13769: Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States, 3 C.F.R (2017).
4
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Reasonable Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations,”
Asylum Division (2017).

7
illegal entry along the Southwest border. This policy created the grounds for U.S. attorneys to
prosecute asylum seekers as criminals and justify family separation.5 In November 2018, the
Department of Homeland Security announced the “Remain in Mexico” policy; migrants who
arrive at the United States Southern border without documentation must wait in Mexico
throughout their immigration proceedings.6 In April 2019, under the premise of “restoring
integrity to our immigration system,” the Trump Administration issued a memorandum to begin
requiring fees for asylum applications, making the United States one of only four countries to
charge people for seeking asylum.7 President Trump also increased the regular citizenship
application fee, and the renewal fee for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).8 In
July 2019, the Trump Administration threatened to impose tariffs, enforce travel bans, and tax
remittances against Guatemala unless this developing country in Central America signed the Safe
Third Country Agreement.9 This policy allows the United States to deport and repatriate asylum
seekers if they pass through this “safe third country” during migration.10 As 2020 began,
President Trump reduced legal refugee admissions to 18,000 human beings, a striking decrease
from the 110,000 admittances President Obama established at the end of his term.11

5

United States Department of Justice, “Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal
Entry,” Office of Public Affairs (2018).
6
Kirstjen M. Nielson, “Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols,” Department of
Homeland Security (2019).
7
Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Miriam Jordan, “New Trump Administration Proposal Would Charge Asylum Seekers
an Application Fee,” The New York Times (November 8, 2019).
8
United States Office of the President, Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border
Security and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, 3 C.F.R (2019).
9
Steve Holland, “Guatemala Agrees to New Migration Measures to Avoid Trump Sanctions Threat,” Thomson
Reuters News (July 27, 2019).
10
Office of Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Guatemala (19-1115)—Agreement on Cooperation Regarding
the Examination of Protected Claims (July 26, 2019).
11
United States Office of the President, Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, 3
C.F.R (November 1, 2019).
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Under current policy, refugees seeking protection in the form of asylum are treated as
criminals. Upon entry into the United States, many asylum seekers are forcibly separated from
their families, experience cursory immigration hearings, and are thrown into deportation centers.
If the asylum seeker is not detained in the United States, the Remain in Mexico Policy and the
Safe-Third Party Agreement subject the applicant for “safe” refuge to further harm.
Women who claim asylum following gender-based violence have always faced particular
scrutiny. They must negotiate the suspicion that their claims do not meet the requirements of
asylum law. Asylum law stipulates five possible grounds to seek protection: race, religion,
nationality, political opinion (PO), or membership in a particular social group (PSG)—this final
ground is the most nebulous. Asylum seekers fleeing gender-based violence—including intimate
partner violence, sexual violence, gang-related violence, and violence against LGBTQ people—
most often utilize the PSG ground. In recent years, Central American women are seeking asylum
following gender-based harms at increasing rates.12 Public officials who discuss the legality and
purpose of asylum jurisprudence often cite the increase in women asylum seekers as a reason for
heightened examination of the asylum system.
In 2009, an Immigration Judge granted Rody Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman, asylum
after an exhaustive 14-year odyssey within the U.S. courts and immigration system. Ms.
Alvarado had fled Guatemala following years of domestic violence. Following this case and a
related Board of Immigration Appeals13 decision in the Matter of A-R-C-G- (2014), using the
particular social group ground to seek asylum following gender-based violence appeared to be

12

Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh, “Gender-based Violence in Central America and
Women Asylum Seekers in the United States,” Translational Criminology, (Winter 2019).
13
The Board of Immigration Appeals (The Board or BIA) is an administrative appellate panel of judges that reviews
the decisions of immigration courts. BIA decisions can overturn or uphold the decision by a lower court. Most BIA
decisions are unpublished; however, some decisions are selected for publication and become precedential law.
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settled law and policy. However, a recent decision by the Trump Administration, the Matter of
A-B-, has shattered the PSG ground in cases of gender-based violence. In the current political
environment, gender-based asylum has become even more tenuous.
The immigration system includes asylum officers, immigration judges, appeals courts,
appellate judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals, Federal Court of Appeals, and on occasion,
the Supreme Court. Asylum seekers who are not guaranteed representation must navigate this
labyrinth and struggle against hopelessness. The Matter of A-B- illuminates the complexities that
limit, challenge, and ultimately block women’s ability to seek asylum in the United States.
Ms. A.B. entered the U.S. to seek protection following fifteen years of extreme abuse by
her ex-husband.14 Immigration Judge Couch did not find her claim credible and denied her
asylum application.15 Ms. A.B. appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the three-judge
panel found her testimony credible and asserted that her PSG followed precedent. The BIA
remanded the case to the Charlotte Immigration Court pending further background checks. Judge
Couch refused to re-hear her case. Attorney General (AG) Jefferson Sessions took advantage of
this divergence of opinion, asserting a rarely-used power under the 1980 Refugee Act
authorizing U.S. Attorneys General to remand cases to themselves. AG Sessions specifically
questioned “whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity
constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or
withholding of removal.”16 On June 11, 2018, Attorney General Sessions overturned the BIA

14

Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). This decision has been amply documented by the Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS). CGRS provides legal support, produces research, and engages in appellate
litigation to protect the rights of refugee women, children, LGBT individuals, and others fleeing persecution. For
more information, please turn to the CGRS website: https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/about.
15
In August 2019, President Trump promoted Judge Stuart Couch to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
16
Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), 317.
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ruling and denied Ms. A.B. asylum. This decision has had tremendous impact. The Matter of AB- overturned years of legal precedent that established avenues to seek asylum following genderbased harms. AG Sessions’ decision misunderstands the reality of violence against women by
placing gender-based violence in the private sphere.
Karen Musalo, UC Hastings law professor and asylum authority explains, “In the United
States, few refugee issues have been as controversial as that of gender asylum.”17 To explain and
critique this controversy, I will scrutinize the U.S. asylum system, which allows judges,
adjudicators, and policymakers to determine who deserves U.S. protection. These decisions
function within a paternalistic system that reproduces forms of power reminiscent of colonialism.
To properly address this systemic injustice, I apply a feminist anti-colonial approach to fully
demonstrate the existence of such paternalistic roots.
The discourse within asylum decisions reveals how the U.S. judicial system exercises
undue and imbalanced power over asylum seekers. Further, asylum decisions provide insight into
the global treatment of women. The justice establishment’s positions illuminate how gender
operates as a form of marginalization to perpetuate the “differential humanity” of colonialism.18
Examining asylum decisions also writes a larger story: how power is practiced in the United
States. Gender-based asylum case law implicates the colonial nature of the relationship between
the United States and Guatemala, a paternalistic structure that emphasizes superiority and

17

Karen Musalo, “A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very
Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women's Claims,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January
2010), 46.
18
Lucy Mayblin defines the concept of “differential humanity” as a term used to make sense of modern hostility
toward asylum seekers. The process of colonization created different “categories of man,” and assigned levels of
worth to individuals depending on their position within this power structure. “Differential humanity” underscores
how human bodies are ordered depending on their “worth.” I extend Mayblin’s theory to the experience of women
immigrants, who are further marginalized within this system of “worth” because of their gender. Lucy Mayblin,
Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield International, 2018), 37
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control. The paternalistic power relationship—which extends back decades—is emblematic of
systems of power and control that the U.S. has employed in other countries in Latin America.
The U.S tested practices in Guatemala that later expanded across the region. As a result, this
analysis of recent Guatemalan history illuminates broader trends across the region.
In Chapter I, I provide a review of the frameworks that have helped to situate my
argument. I discuss the developments of feminist international relations and provide an
explication of a feminist, anti-colonial approach. The discussion of these feminist theories
underscores the lens I apply in the chapters that follow. The methodology section explains the
decision to utilize a textual analysis, as well as the process I used to obtain the case documents.
Chapter II explores the historical relationship between the United States and Guatemala,
in order to situate the paternalistic nature of asylum. I review the 1954 U.S. backed coup d’état
which overthrew the democratically-elected president and installed a military dictatorship.
During the thirty-six-year Guatemalan Civil War which followed, the United States provided
weaponry, military training, and guidance that led Guatemalans to commit acts of mass killings,
disappearances, and rape. The end of the Civil War did not end the violence in Guatemala. I
examine the connections between United States policy and increased drug and gang violence in
post-war Guatemala. I explore how the genocidal Civil War solidified an enduring culture of
violence—in particular gender-based violence—which created an impetus for survivors to seek
asylum in the United States.
Chapter III examines the culture of gender-based violence in Guatemala, and its
relationship to the Civil War, which established a cultural norm that accepts violent aggression. I
discuss the realities of domestic violence, femicide, non-intimate partner violence, and gang
violence, and identify how these realities are impacted by socioeconomic status and indigeneity.
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I evaluate the written legal guarantees and systems of protection and security within the
Guatemalan state, demonstrating the systemic weakness and glaring levels of impunity. The
system’s abject failures result in hopelessness and provide the stimulus for Guatemalan women
to take the drastic step of leaving their home and family to seek protection in the United States.
Chapter IV offers an explanation of the international definition and evolution of the
asylum system. I provide a succinct review of regulations within United States asylum law and
policies.
With this contextualization, Chapter V, the body of this research, focuses on the human
beings impacted by asylum policy. I interrogate the marginalization and reproduction of
victimhood by addressing the gendered factors that influence asylum. A textual analysis on the
legal documents of 24 gender-based asylum cases supports this examination. Specifically, I
consider the issue of victimization, examine the limitations of the “particular social group”
rubric, and explore how this distortion demoralizes the asylum seeker. The next section unpacks
the challenges for a woman who must prove she experienced “persecution,” a problematic
linguistic model which misnames gendered violence as a private act. To prove persecution,
asylum seekers must establish a nexus claim—a connection between acts of violence and the
stated enumerated ground—and meet a judge’s determination of credibility. The next section
discusses the gendered structure within the use of narrative, and how the act of storytelling
creates a problematic dichotomy separating the “deserving” from the “undeserving.” I have
chosen to examine the particular experience of Guatemalan women seeking asylum to showcase
how factual distortions, institutionalized prejudice, and misogyny impact the asylum process.
In sum, this thesis argues that the roots of the controversiality of gender-based asylum lie
in a paternalistic structure that continues to reproduce harm. Despite a philosophical framework

13
in which asylum is declared a universal right, I conclude that the United States and the developed
world in general behave otherwise. Instead, I explore how the United States asylum process
reflects the U.S. perception of Guatemalan women, rooted in colonial power.
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CHAPTER I: EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODS
An Anti-colonial Feminist Understanding of Asylum
Examining United States asylum law requires a recognition of its transnational nature. In
this chapter, I discuss the theoretical frameworks that have influenced my central argument: the
United States asylum system is rooted in a paternalistic power structure indicative of
colonialism. In International Relations, paternalistic relationships create the assumption that
people from the developed world are superior to people from the less developed world. This
structure facilitates hierarchies of power where “liberal states need to take care of backward
peoples or lower races.”19 In this thesis, I define paternalism as actions that articulate power and
superiority by enforcing control. Paternalistic acts of control favor one person’s or government’s
choices over another’s, with the implied assumption that the power is asserted over another for
that other’s own good.20 To begin this argument, I summarize the advancement of feminist
international relations, a perspective that developed from discourse in international law and
international relations. This project also utilizes an anti-colonial feminist approach to articulate
the roots of power. When understood in unison, these feminist theories inform the lens I apply to
asylum law. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of my primary methodology, a textual
analysis of relevant case documents.

19

In Hobson’s analysis, the “developed” and “less developed” world are categorized as “imperial powers” and
“backwards people.” David Long, “Paternalism and the Internationalization of Imperialism: J.A. Hobson and the
International Government of the “Lower Races,” in Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of
International Relations, edited by David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2005), 72.
20
David Long explains: “From a feminist perspective, the metaphor of the parent-child is in fact paternalistic in a
more specific sense […] It might indeed be argued that the discourse of paternalism feminizes as well as infantilizes
the other in order to create a domesticated context in which the usual rules of public order and property in
international relations can be suspended or deferred, and coercive policies justified.” Through paternalism, the
“other” is positioned as inferior, which validates the use of “coercive” (in this thesis: controlling) political agendas.
Ibid, 73. Citing to J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (New York, New York: James Pott and Company, 1902).
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Part I: Feminist International Relations
United States asylum policy was formulated in recognition of International Law (IL). I
turn to IL theory as a means to understand the imbalanced relationship between the United States
and Guatemala.21 The discipline of IL centers around the rules and norms that are accepted by
states in the international community. Without any singular overarching enforcer, theorists
puzzle over why states abide by the provisions set by IL. Jana Von Stein explains that the lack of
a clear authority to oversee decisions creates challenges. Compliance with international law
becomes a “problem of enforcement.”22 Countries often use other strategies to engender
compliance: inducements, reciprocity, and reputation. I find that theories of international law
cannot fully articulate why countries comply with international standards. However, international
law “serves as a framework for the practice of stable and organized international relations
(IR).”23 International Relations provides scaffolding to analyze the structure of migration law
and asylum policy.
International Relations emerged with the two World Wars as a sub-discipline within
political science.24 IR used methods from natural science and economics to build theory—with a
primary focus on conflict and war.25 Traditional IR scholarship utilized primarily positivist
methods, asserting that the social world can be examined using the same methods as the natural
world, and establishing a focus on the use of neutral facts.26 Feminist International Relations

21

United States asylum law developed in response to the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
22
Jana Von Stein, "Compliance with International Law,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies,
(November 20, 2017).
23
Von Stein, "Compliance with International Law.”
24
J. Ann Tickner, "Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International
Relations." Signs Vol. 30, No. 4 (2005), 2175.
25
Ibid, 2175.
26
Ibid, 2176.
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emerged in the 1980s as part of a broader critique to the positivist standpoint as an inadequate
and incomplete approach to IR studies. Theorists expressed skepticism of traditional knowledgebuilding that centered masculine views and men’s lives. Feminist IR scholars critiqued
mainstream IR for being uninterested in the ways in which gendered concepts influenced
international events, including conflict. The new strand of IR gave scholars greater purchase to
the kinds of problems that exist in the global world.
In 1988, the IR journal Millennium devoted a special issue to women in international
relations. This issue contained a critique by scholar Fred Halliday. He emphasized that
traditional IR theory, rendered from a masculine viewpoint, excludes women from study—
hindering the ability of IR theory to explain global political realities.27 In a subsequent issue,
scholars Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland argued that IR theory was severely restricted by a
focus on conflict and outright war, traditional “manly” pursuits.28 This militarized focus
sidelined “soft politics” (read: feminine politics), which emphasized structural injustices that
often lead to war. Ann Tickner contends that many feminist theorists of IR are “post-positivist,”
challenging the perspective that states and the global world must be studied objectively,
numerically.29 Instead, Tickner asserts that feminist IR scholars rely on “narrative-based,
interpretative, and ethnographic methodologies” which focus on the lived experiences of people
as a method of understanding the social components of politics.30 This approach threatened
traditional IR scholarship. As Tickner explained, feminist IR scholars developed “distinctive

27

Jacqui True, "Feminism and Gender Studies in International Relations Theory," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
International Studies (November 30, 2017).
28
Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, Gender and International Relations, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1991).
29
J. Ann Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists."
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1997), 622.
30
True, "Feminism and Gender Studies in International Relations Theory."
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methodological perspectives or frameworks which fundamentally challenges the often unseen
androcentric or masculine biases in the way that knowledge has traditionally been constructed.”31
Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui True claim that feminist writers contribute to the field of IR by
asking specific questions about the representation of women in conversations about international
security and prosperity.32
Feminist IR is “bottom up”33: focusing on the lives of the disadvantaged to address and
transform institutional structure. Annica Kronsell writes, “the personal is the international.”34
The study of women’s lives allows for a better understanding of the pattern of global politics.35
Tickner writes, “Whereas much of IR is focused on explaining the behavior of states, feminists
are motivated by emancipatory goals — investigating the often disadvantaged lives of women
within states or international institutions and structures in order to change them,”36 Emphasizing
the significance of gender in the structures of international life, feminist IR focuses on the
individual experience. The lived realities of one woman become useful in examining the wider
context of implicit gendered power relations by providing a specific subject of study. Feminist

31

J. Ann Tickner, “Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues.” In Feminist
Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, (Cambridge,
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20.
32
Brooke A. Ackerly and Jacqui True, “Studying the Struggles and Wishes of the Age: Feminist Theoretical
Methodology and Feminist Theoretical Methods.” In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by
Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 243.
33
J. Ann Tickner, "Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International
Relations," 2182.
34
Annica Kronsell, “Methods for Studying Silences: Gender Analysis in Instructions of Hegemonic Masculinity” In
Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 127.
35
Ibid.
36
J. Ann Tickner, "Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International
Relations," 2178.

18
IR argues that to understand social reality, studying the perspectives of people at the margins or
on the lower rungs of the power hierarchy provides an essential view.37
Feminist IR is particularly necessary when critiquing the complex power structures
relevant to the study of asylum. Those seeking asylum are supplicants, on bent knee, literally
begging for safety. Asylum seekers are on the lowest rungs of the power system and live at the
margin of their society. Only by fully understanding the specific experience of individual women
seeking asylum can we understand the wider dimension of the international power relationship.
As Bina D’Costa explains, an “unresolved past has the power to ferociously destabilize the
present.”38 D’Costa affirms the process of studying marginalized groups that have often been
excluded from the body of produced knowledge, in order to create a more complete picture of
nation building.39 D’Costa defines marginalization as a “social status linked to particular
identities or social groups.”40 Women remain marginal in traditional power hierarchies. Refugees
and immigrants are marginalized further in developed nations due to nationality, ethnicity, and
language ability.41 In Guatemala, societal standards inform gender roles that implicate women’s
ability to act with autonomy. I draw on the feminist IR strategy of analyzing marginalized people
by highlighting the ways in which women are treated within Guatemala. This methodology
allows for conclusions about political realities in Guatemala, and the compelling needs for
migration.

37

S. Laurel Weldon, “Inclusion and Understanding: A Collective Methodology for Feminist International
Relations.” Chapter. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria
Stern, and Jacqui True, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 79.
38
Bina D'Costa, “Marginalized Identity: New Frontiers of Research for IR?” Chapter. In Feminist Methodologies for
International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, (Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 129.
39
Ibid, 129.
40
Ibid, 130.
41
Ibid, 130.
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Part II: From Colonialism and Coloniality to a Feminist Anti-Colonial Approach
In this research project, I assert that recognizing the impacts of marginalization requires a
specific awareness of the legacies of colonialism, and the effects of this historical relationship on
individuals who seek asylum. Arpita Chakraborty writes that the “ghost of colonialism is not yet
dead, and every now and then it raises its ugly head.”42 Lucy Mayblin defines colonialism as “a
form of domination, the control of individuals or groups over the territory and or behavior of
other individuals or groups.”43 Mayblin explains that while historians now view colonialism as a
“dirty business,” conducted by malevolent opportunists, early historians often accepted the
colonists self-serving argument that they were engaged in a “praise-worthy endeavor” enacted by
great nation benefactors who volunteer to save the “wretched, the savage, the unfortunate.”44
Anibal Quijano defined this hierarchy as the “coloniality of power.”45 This system
reduced and dehumanized the colonized, creating a structure of power where certain individual’s
rights—to land, education, healthcare, and opportunity—are more worthy than other
individuals’. 46 The idea of modernity, which orders humanity into either past or present/future,
supports colonialism. Modern states view less developed peoples as backward and unworthy,
allowing colonists to assert that human rights deemed fundamental in their own country are
actually “earned through promotion into the ranks of the modern.”47 I utilize this idea to
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formulate my argument that the asylum system is rooted in modernity. Asylum seekers must
“earn” the right to safety.
This dichotomous relationship between entitled human and non-entitled human in the
structure of colonialism was further reproduced in categorizations of men and women. In
“Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” María Lugones argues that Quijano’s framework is too
narrow: it does not account for the effects of gender relationships. She asserts that the very
existence of gendered power distinctions is rooted in coloniality. Therefore, questioning the ways
in which gender is a colonial imposition becomes the foundation of decolonial work. As
colonialism expanded, the Western man imposed a “non-human” identity on the colonized which
enforced conceptions of man and woman. Lugones argues that understanding colonialism and
the “capitalist world system of power” requires analyzing the “intersection of gender, class, and
race.” Engaging with work of feminists of color, Lugones showcases how the sophisticated
organization of people by gender mirrored colonial production of racial hierarchies. In Lugones’
argument, decolonial work must explore how women have been “subalternized,” systematically
banished from the hierarchies of power in the colony.48 Lugones proposes that feminist
researchers must “learn about each other as resisters to the coloniality of gender at the colonial
difference.”49 Instead of attempting to erase the colonial difference, Lugones calls on feminist
scholars to stress recognition. Lugones’ thinking informs my perception of how Guatemalan
women exist within the coloniality of gender. In order to perform an anticolonial feminist
analysis of the asylum system, I first articulate how women are “subalternized” before entry, and
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then how they are subjugated further in the judicial system, a system that fails to recognize the
impact of past colonial relationships.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak provides further analysis about the production of the
subaltern. She writes, “The ‘third world woman,’ [is] silenced […] through a form of
ventriloquism.”50 Through the guise of providing a voice to the oppressed, Western academics
erroneously position themselves as “knowers of and spokespersons for the subaltern.” 51 This
false representation can be addressed by incorporating a feminist response to colonialism. 52 To
grapple with the unfinished nature of colonization, which maintains structures of power, the
observer should recognize the process of representation.
I avoid false representation by incorporating an anti-colonial feminist perspective. This
form of analysis provides theoretical and methodological frameworks to perform cross-cultural
research. In “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor,” Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang warn that
colonial structures of power can be reproduced during efforts to decolonize.53 They argue that in
order to achieve authentic decolonization, work must include “giving back land and relations to
land that have been taken.”54 Often conversations that use the phrase “decolonize” fail to include
this step, making decolonization a metaphor. By using the term decolonization to describe all
work that struggles against imperialism, researchers and activists perform “moves to
innocence.”55 Tuck and Yang describe these actions as sets of “distractions and diversions” that
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do not actually support decolonization.56 This work falls within the category of social justice
activism—but should be labeled anti-colonial.57 This research does not focus on returning
colonized land. Therefore, to avoid performing the “metaphor” of decolonization, I utilize an
anti-colonial lens in my evaluation of the asylum system. This system often uses and reproduces
paternalistic, colonial thinking and practice as those in power decide whom among the many are
worthy of humanitarian aid. Applying an anti-colonial lens to the asylum system reframes the
discussion of power. I incorporate anti-colonial praxis by discussing the continuing injustice
within the system through an examination of issues that are hidden or sidelined.
In “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and
Heteropatriarchy”, authors Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck, and Angie Morrill argue that feminist theory
overlooks two connected issues: The United States is a settler colonial nation-state, and settler
colonialism is rooted in gendered structures. Therefore, feminist scholarship must focus on the
still-functioning structure of settler colonialism, and how this structure affects marginalized
people.58 The U.S., by definition an immigrant country, evolved through notions of white
supremacy and heteropatriarchy. Since the beginning of U.S. settlement, people have been
racialized and gendered.59 Studies of indigenous people, or other marginalized peoples, often
remain rooted in colonialism. Settler colonialism, Arvin, Tuck, and Morril explain, is
characterized by a drive “to make itself seem natural, without origin (and without end), and

56
57

58

Ibid, 21.
Ibid, 19.

Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck, and Angie Morrill. "Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler
Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy,” Feminist Formations, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins
University Press, Spring 2013), 9.
59
Ibid, 9.

23
inevitable.”60 Feminists perform anti-colonial work by including the marginalized as they
critique systems of power and suggest remedies in the form of structural change.61
Lucy Mayblin provides an example of the utility of an anti-colonial framework to
examine asylum policy in her work Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of
Asylum Seeking.62 She utilizes the British state as a case study to argue that contemporary
hostility toward asylum seekers is “dehumanization within the context of colonial histories.”63
Mayblin emphasizes how current exclusionary asylum policies developed directly from the
settler colonial system and concepts of modernity. She argues for an analysis of this broader
power system through a view of the relationship between coloniality and modernity, stating that
“The refugee—is the embodiment of the darker side of modernity and of global fallout from
colonialism.”64 Mayblin emphasizes that historical ideas of “differential humanity” that have
roots in colonialism led to modern treatment of asylum seekers. Mayblin explains that antiasylum sentiments are entangled with historical ideas of racism, but asylum policy should not be
conceptualized distinctly as a form of racism. This type of analysis ignores the “colonial histories
which have allowed for the assignment of differential worth to various human bodies.” 65
Recognition of this stratification of worth provides a more complete view of the experience of
asylum seekers. Examining the legacies of colonialism develops a framework for understanding
how historical ideas of “differential humanity” have led to the treatment of asylum seekers in the
modern Western world.
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Finally, Arpita Chakraborty, Geeta Chowdhry and L.H.M. Ling discuss how international
relations can address colonialism: bridging the two lenses I incorporate in my analysis.
Chakraborty warns that traditional IR scholarship is born out of imperialism, so IR requires a
new perspective to reflect the “lived reality” of subjects.66 Chakraborty emphasizes the use of a
postcolonial feminist version of IR to add the voices of the powerless. Adding this perspective
provides a better understanding of the “matrices of power” which are produced by the legacy of
colonization.67 Chowdhry and Ling also defend the use of “postcolonial feminism” in IR which
specifically studies “world politics as a site of power relations molded by colonization.”68
Postcolonial feminism calls attention to the ways in which first-world feminism continues to
proliferate the “imperial agenda.”69A feminist viewpoint critiques the predominantly male view
of most IR; an anti-colonial feminist IR perspective critiques the first-world standpoint that
maintains the “white-women-as norm” phenomenon.70 Chandra Mohanty similarly argues that
first-world feminist texts often reproduce colonial viewpoints by portraying “monolithic images
of the ‘third-world woman’ as women who can only be defined as material subjects.”71

Part III: Methodology and Sources
These two feminist approaches inform my examination of colonial power structures. Eve
Tuck and K Wayne Yang’s text highlights the importance of selecting terminology with purpose.
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In their argument, decolonial work describes acts of liberation. When these acts are performed
incompletely or without critical change, they can fail. Anticolonial work emphasizes the need to
take an activist-political position to reveal injustice. I label my approach anti-colonial in an effort
to recognize the effect of this research and the distinction between the two terms. The impact of
this project does not address the return of colonized land, but the anti-colonial lens facilitates a
commitment to active work by addressing embedded power dynamics and exposing the systemic
bias of the asylum system. The methods in this research focus on giving voice and creating space
for histories and experiences that have been hidden, buried, or denied. By emphasizing personal
narratives and previously disclosed pieces of the U.S.-Guatemalan relationship, I centralize the
experience of people victimized by the system. Careful documentation of the consistent and
repetitive patterns of injustices, empowers activists to work towards changing the system.
Recording injustices within individual asylum cases gives essential voice to women asylum
seekers, their lived reality, and the hurdles they must navigate to survive within the unjust
system. The tools of analysis within the anti-colonial approach enabled the creation of this body
of information: documentation which intends to change the nature of unequal power by
constructing a more complete picture of historic and present injustice.
To provide the historical context for the relationship between the U.S. and Guatemala, I
examine a wealth of analytical sources. I retrieved most primary source documents from the
National Security Archives collection of declassified U.S. files on Guatemala. I surveyed all
available documents with publication dates between 1940 and 1996, the end of the Guatemalan
Civil War. To supplement this personal investigation, I communicated with Kate Doyle, the
director of the National Security Archives Guatemala Project. I also read excerpts from the text
From Silence to Memory, a report composed of primary source documents published by the
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Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional in Guatemala, and reviewed documents released by the
CIA under the Freedom of Information Act. When possible, I accessed archived United States
newspaper articles that reported on major events which were of interest to U.S. publications. I
also utilize secondary source material, principally scholarly books written by experts on the
Guatemalan conflict and broader U.S. relations with Latin America. Many of the secondary
sources apply similar investigation tactics: the scrutiny of declassified documents, examination
of historical trends, and completion of a series of ethnographies.
A feminist IR framework helps establish my method of research for my primary
investigation. I analyze twenty-four Guatemalan gender-based asylum cases. I use textual
analysis to uncover different systems of prejudice and misogyny that develop within the judicial
decisions. As previously noted, feminist IR recognizes the utility of using individual, specific
subjects to address a wider experience. Sara McKinnon defines a text “as any instance where
symbols are being used to convey meaning to an audience.”72 In this project, I focus on how
texts convey meaning about the existence of power hierarchies and discriminatory beliefs, which
are rooted in colonialism and displayed through asylum jurisprudence.
To perform this investigation, I used the online legal database LexisNexis to access
relevant judicial decisions. The documents available on this site include opinions from the
United States Appeals Courts, Immigration Judges (IJ), and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). An IJ decision can either grant or deny asylum.73 I searched for terms including:
“Guatemalan gender-based asylum,” “Guatemalan woman asylum,” and “Gender, Asylum,
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Guatemala.” The search terms yielded different case records. I used precedent-setting cases as
search terms to identify other cases about gender-based asylum. I also utilized the Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS) database. Through the CGRS database, I accessed IJ and
BIA decisions, as well as briefs written by attorneys to present the facts, arguments, and
protected grounds. Selected documents on the CGRS database are available by request. CGRS
also shares amicus curiae briefs and letters of support for more publicized cases.74 Last, if the
asylum seeker’s name was public information, I performed a routine Google search to find
newspaper articles and other lay documents.
Within the textual analysis of the legal documents, I utilize both rhetorical criticism and a
discourse analysis. Sara McKinnon defines rhetorical criticism as “a method that provides the
means to analyze not only discourse itself, but also how messages are deployed through the
body, voice, images, and objects, and what such messages do.”75 Evaluating tone, word choice,
and subjective assessment of the asylum seeker’s disposition, I critique how underlying
conceptions of Guatemalan women are “deployed” within the documents. I explain how these
messages function to reproduce marginalization and emphasize specific victimhood. Discourse
analysis brings further strength to the method of textual analysis by calling on researchers to
think about function: what effect does the text have on the organization, institutions, and
societies in which it circulates?76 I utilize this technique to emphasize how the documents reflect
general societal perceptions of Guatemalan women within the United States. To denaturalize the
acceptance of a paternalistic framework and discuss how outcomes maintain the creation of the
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“subalternized” identity, I perform a feminist textual analysis to highlight the injustices in the
asylum system.
I do not claim that a singular case can represent all experiences; rather individual cases
allow for an investigation of patterns in judicial decisions that reveal and document the overall
hierarchy of power within the asylum system. Incorporating the anti-colonial framework, I study
the ways in which asylum seekers are represented. I present my analysis with an intention to
critique the power hierarchy embedded in the U.S. asylum system. Incorporating the
International Relations framework, I offer conclusions about different international powers that
have authority over the structure of asylum law. Because of my positionality as a white,
privileged, educated, American citizen, I perform this analysis as an observer, removed from the
system I am studying. Therefore, to properly articulate an anti-colonial perspective I commit
directly to articulating methods to change the injustices within the asylum system. I discuss the
United States asylum process through an anti-colonial framework to draw attention to how
narratives of asylum seeking create labels of deserving and undeserving applicants. I fuse an
anti-colonial feminist perspective with feminist international relations to bring recognition to the
transnational implications of asylum and problematize understandings of power.
My choice to focus on cases of Guatemalan women is two-fold. First, the relationship
between the United States and Guatemala provides a salient site to examine structures of power.
As I will discuss in Chapter II, the United States has intervened in Guatemalan politics and
economics for decades, with the intention to disrupt and overthrow popular movements and limit
national prosperity. The relationship between Guatemala and the United States is not unique—
instead, it can be read as emblematic of greater power trends between the United States and Latin
America. The U.S. has acted in similar manners throughout the region, though many of the
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specific government strategies were utilized first in Guatemala. Therefore, this particular case
study could be extended to other regions. Second, multiple precedent-setting cases of genderbased asylum claims are from women of Guatemalan origin. Therefore, choosing Guatemala
allows for a wider breadth of cases to analyze—an important feature for this project.
Finally, I have chosen Guatemala because of my own connection to the country. I have
had the opportunity to spend extended time living in San Lucas Toliman, Guatemala—a small
town on Lake Atitlan, ringed by dormant volcanoes. During this time, I have worked in a
medical clinic and as an advocate at a women’s safe house, taught English classes, and learned to
weave. The moments I remember with the most power and significance are the conversations I
had with my host-father and friends about their lives. My host father told me about his time in
the military during the Civil War, and the impact this experience had on his adult life. My
weaving teacher confided in me about fears of interpersonal violence she faces daily. All these
experiences have had a profound impact on my interest in studying Latin America. This
investigation has given me the opportunity to learn more about the complex history of a country
that has shaped my identity and academic interest.
Gender-based asylum is rooted in prejudiced understandings of women—and the
immigration authorities’ ability to read and evaluate women refugees allows intolerant beliefs to
function as accepted claims, emphasizing paternalistic power systems. The field of research
devoted to gender-based asylum is vast; but this project attempts to bring in a new lens. By
selecting one country of focus, I aim to provide specific conclusions about how asylum
jurisprudence can characterize a bilateral relationship. Through both a review of the relationship
between the United States and Guatemala, and an analysis of asylum decisions, this project will
offer an anti-colonial critique of the asylum system.
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CHAPTER II: THE UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALA
A History of Intervention, Instability, and Paternalism
“The United States [seems] destined to plague and torment the continent in the name of freedom” (Simón Bolívar, 1829).

In 1996, the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords ended thirty-six years of violence in
Guatemala. The Accords established a truth commission, the Commission for Historical
Clarification (CEH), with the slogan “Es Tiempo de Decir La Verdad.” Published in 1999, the
final report, Memoria de Silencio, provided the Guatemalan people and the international
community with needed information about the atrocities of the Civil War. The Report outlines
U.S. influence and culpability. The CEH report recognized the United States’ awareness of
violence, and reluctance to intervene. After the release, President Bill Clinton traveled to
Guatemala City. Clinton made a public speech “to an informal gathering of leaders from many
sectors of Guatemalan society…”. In an unusual statement of transparency, Clinton said: ''For the
United States, it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence
units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States
must not repeat that mistake.''77 The introduction to Memoria de Silencio asserts, “The full extent
of the U.S. involvement in la violencia is still not known.”78 Over two decades have passed.
President Clinton’s admission of guilt has not meaningfully informed either the greater U.S.
government or the general public, many of whom remain unaware of U.S. involvement in
Guatemalan affairs.
Susanne Jonas writes that the “fruits of [United States] interventions have been veiled in
a vast shroud of silence in the U.S. press and public domain.”79 This silence perpetuates
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negligence and allows the United States to present a distorted picture of history. In Turning the
Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace, Noam Chomsky writes
that an assessment of U.S. relationships to other countries provides “striking and systematic
features” of how United States “international behavior[s] are suppressed, ignored or denied.”80
This deliberate “suppression” and/or “silence” distorts reality. The United States government
negates responsibility for its actions, sustaining a system that enables the powerful to intervene—
without reckoning. In Empire’s Workshop, Greg Grandin argues that the United States used
Latin America as a “workshop” to establish the mechanisms to build an empire. Grandin
emphasizes the 1940s, when “Latin America once again became a school where the United
States studied how to execute imperial violence through proxies.”81 In my view, Guatemala
merits heightened focus as the first country where the U.S. used covert action to overthrow an
elected government. After U.S. involvement in Guatemala, similar interventions occurred
throughout Latin America. The United States’ actions in Guatemala were rooted in deliberate
planning. U.S. intervention facilitated the creation of a hierarchy of power—where the U.S.
enacted a system of “differential humanity,” guiding Guatemala into violence by perceiving the
Guatemalan population as “undeserving” of stability or democracy.82 The Guatemalan genocide
of the 1980s could not have been possible without the U.S. military training, economic aid, and
political support that began in the 1940s and 1950s.
In this chapter, I provide the necessary context to understand the complex relationship
between the United States and Guatemala. An understanding of this relationship—the
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development and enactment of a power hierarchy—is necessary to properly interrogate the
paternalistic nature of asylum. I trace the lasting power structures within this relationship in
order to defend my argument that the asylum system reproduces forms of power reminiscent of
colonial paternalism. This section will provide the information to answer the following
questions: Why did the United States choose to intervene in matters of Guatemalan domestic
policy during the 1940s and 50s? How did this intervention lead to the events of the Civil War,
and the development of the “culture of violence”? How has the United States continued to
support violence, contributing to overall destabilization?
To address the concerns of Jonas, Chomsky, and Grandin, leading scholars in the field of
Latin America history, the next sections focus on the U.S. role in Guatemala. I rely on
publications by social and political scholars, as well as primary source documents that reveal
U.S. intentions. Though not intended as a complete monograph of Guatemalan history, this
discussion highlights U.S. interventions that destabilized Guatemala and fomented rampant
violence, and particularly violence against women.
First, I address the interactions between the United States and Guatemala pre-1954,
including the establishment and monopolistic business venture of the United Fruit Company
(UFCO). Next, I highlight the planning and execution of the 1954 U.S.-backed coup d’état (the
coup), overthrowing democracy and installing a military dictatorship. I continue my timeline
with an analysis of U.S. involvement in the Civil War, including the decision to provide political
guidance, weaponry, and military training. These interventions propelled Guatemalans to commit
acts of mass killings, disappearances, and rape against their own people. Throughout La
Violencia, the U.S. government and general public turned a blind eye to the acts of violence.
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Finally, I follow the rising violence during the Civil War to the influx of organized crime that
remains a powerful force in modern Guatemala.
A discussion of the relationship between the United States and Guatemala is essential to
understanding the injustices of the asylum system. First, pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, asylum decisions require the claimant to demonstrate that the sending country
was “unable or unwilling” to protect the applicant. In most asylum cases, this evaluation is
limited to country conditions research that highlights levels of violence within the sending
country. This choice is too narrow and enables the U.S. to “silence” and “suppress” its
culpability in the creation of violence. Second, U.S. intervention during the 20th century
demonstrates a willingness to prioritize American ideology and financial prosperity at any cost.83
The history of the U.S. relationship with Guatemala showcases actions of paternalism that are
mirrored in the current asylum system. Actions during the 20th century also demonstrate the use
of a paternalistic ideologic guise to mask fear and aggression over the loss of control. In this
thesis, I define paternalism as actions that articulate one person’s—or one government’s—
superiority over another. Through the enactment of power, the paternalistic body enforces
control. Paternalistic acts of control favor one group’s choices over another’s, within this defined
hierarchy, on the basis that the body with power is imposing rules and regulations for the other’s
own good.
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President Donald Trump’s hateful disposition has elevated the problems in an
immigration system that already contained paternalistic beliefs. He consistently frames the
“migrant crisis” as a problem created by foreign governments in foreign territories. This rhetoric
permits his claim that migration “is a way they get certain people out of their country and dump
[them into the] U.S.”84 In addition to revealing President Trump’s absence of compassion, this
ahistorical view ignores the U.S.’s colonial past and present, and its culpability in creating the
violence from which so many now flee. The United States has caused migration, through many
years of implicit and explicit actions that destabilized the Guatemalan state. To understand the
great injustices of the current asylum system, we turn to the historical legacies that established
the Guatemalan state and failed to provide security for its people.

The History of the U.S. Coup d’état
Part I: Developing Economic Concerns and The United Fruit Company
The impact of the United States on Guatemala began many years before the 1954 Coup.
The U.S.’ first major act of paternalism begins with the United Fruit Company’s monopoly over
the banana industry.
The coffee plantations, known as fincas, brought Guatemalan products to the world
market, but led finqueros to exploit indigenous workers.85 When the coffee market collapsed in
the 1930s, the ladino population, the non-indigenous and economically advantaged class in
Guatemala, sought a strong leader who would maintain control and develop new economic
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opportunities. The ladinos hand-picked Jorge Ubico, infamous for his ruthlessness. Ubico ran
unopposed and was inaugurated President of Guatemala in 1931. President Ubico focused his
attention on big American investors like the United Fruit Company (UFCO).86 In hopes of
elevating Guatemala in the U.S. trade market, President Ubico gifted huge amounts of land to
UFCO. In response, UFCO invested financial resources and infrastructure into the country.87
With investments valued at nearly $60 million in pre-WWII U.S. dollars, UFCO provided jobs
directly or indirectly for 40,000 people in Guatemala.88 UFCO monopolized banana production,
and constructed the national railroad and the electric company.89 The Ubico government gave
UFCO exemptions from paying taxes and duties. Further, United Fruit enjoyed unlimited profit
remittances and nonregulation of their labor practices.90 Possessing complete control over a
wealthy export, UFCO continued to provide infrastructure and access to the job market to
maintain the guise that their economic influence facilitated greater good for the Guatemalan
people. Because of this involvement in the economic infrastructure, UFCO held great, influence
over the Guatemalan government.

Part II: The October Revolution and the “Ten Years of Springtime”
In the 1940s, the Guatemalan public began to resent U.S. economic influence and
exploitation of local resources. This period became known as the “October revolution” and was
characterized by democratic changes and modernization.91 In June of 1944, public
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demonstrations, strikes and petitions overwhelmed the Guatemalan capital. In response,
President Ubico relinquished his power to his military generals, who allowed for the first open
democratic election. In 1945, Juan José Arévalo took office and set four primary goals: to create
agrarian reform, protect labor, consolidate political democracy, and install a better education
system.92 Calling his progressive political platform “spiritual socialism,” Arévalo promised to
“make men equal to men…[and] give civic and legal value to all people who live in this
Republic.”93 The U.S. attention was generally focused elsewhere in the early 1940’s—WWII
was raging—but declassified documents from this time show the U.S. State Department had an
early positive perception of President Arévalo. This perception changed in 1947, when the anticommunist Cold War began, and President Arévalo instituted a new Labor Code.94 This Code,
modeled after the U.S. Wagner Act, allowed workers to develop unions, administer collective
bargains, and strike with legal protection. Additionally, the Code provided protections for rural
workers, improved conditions for women and child laborers, and created fixed pay scales.95 Why
would the United States concern itself with the labor code of a foreign country?96 A 1951
declassified State Department Policy Statement explains the U.S.’s concern:
The [Arévalo ] Government’s excessively zealous approach resulted in a biased, prolabor attitude. This, together with increasing nationalism and chauvinism brought it into
direct conflict with […] U.S. interests. […] The principal targets for the demands of these
labor unions were U.S.-owned companies, which were the largest and the most important
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in Guatemala’s economy. Singled out particularly were the U.S.-owned United Fruit
Company and the International Railways of Central America (IRCA)…97
UFCO enjoyed tremendous freedoms during the Ubico regime; the U.S. perceived that the
changes under the Arévalo Administration had assaulted “free enterprise.”98 UFCO felt targeted
by the Labor Code—and complained that the U.S. Embassy provided inadequate support. The
company enlisted lobbyists to convince President Truman that the new “revolutionary” labor
policies proved that Guatemalans were developing communist attitudes.99
Despite growing tension, President Arévalo concluded his presidential term. Jacobo
Arbenz assumed the presidency. The U.S. State Department considered President Arbenz an
“opportunist” who would “steer a more nearly middle course than Arévalo.”100 In his inaugural
address President Arbenz committed himself to three primary objectives.101 He wanted to create:
an independent economy, a modern capitalist state, and a higher standard of living for the
Guatemalan public.102 Determined to transform the Guatemalan economy, President Arbenz
instituted another series of economic reforms. The CIA referred to these reforms as part of "an
intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority
complex of the 'Banana Republic.'"103 The dismissive label “Banana Republic” reveals U.S. bias
about Guatemala, perceived as an economic hub of banana production—and alludes to the power
of the United Fruit Company.
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In 1952, President Arbenz passed Decreto Número 900, the Agrarian Reform Law, which
redistributed uncultivated land.104 This policy was central to the platform of the Partido
Guatemalteco de Trabajo, a communist-leaning labor party that emerged at the end of the
Arévalo presidency.105 Conservative Guatemalans were fearful of the plan, concerned the decree
would provide agency to rural indigenous laborers.106 This concern resonated within the
American government. The CIA had already labeled the Arbenz administration as a potential
threat to U.S. security and financial interests. The U.S. government asserted that land reform
policies signaled communist expansion.107 Following the mandates of the Decree, the Arbenz
government confiscated 55,000 acres of land from the United Fruit Company. The Decree
intensified conflict between the Guatemalan government and UFCO, which continued to deploy
lobbyists and publicists to convince Americans of developing evil in Guatemala.108 Both the
Arévalo and Arbenz administrations faced allegations of communist sympathies. The U.S.
government voiced determination to stop the expansion of the “Soviet menace.”

Part III: The 1954 Coup d’état
Under the pretext of eradicating communism, the CIA backed the 1954 coup d’état,
which ended the “ten years of springtime,” returning Guatemala to an oppressive regime
characterized by violence. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the practice of U.S. paternalism
transitioned to covert intelligence gathering, military training and operations, and the direct use
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of violence. The relationship between U.S. covert operations and Guatemalan security forces
would endure through La Violencia. Less visible, the lessons of military brutality became
ingrained in Guatemalan culture.
The first coup attempt, code-named PBFORTUNE, represented a collaboration between
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, exiled Guatemalan general Carlos Castillo Armas, and
the United States CIA. PBFORTUNE failed, but the CIA did not give up their efforts. In August
of 1953, newly elected President Eisenhower authorized and provided a budget of $2.7 million
for PBSUCCESS.109 The CIA supported the Coup through four initiatives: a propaganda
campaign, overt diplomatic initiatives, covert paramilitary operations, and a political program.
The CIA office of Guatemala operations received the code name LINCOLN.
The CIA developed a propaganda campaign to wage “psychological warfare” against the
Guatemalan enemy: the “pro-Communists.”110 The aim was to discredit the left, while
simultaneously building support among conservative allies.111 The propaganda campaign directly
targeted the civilian Guatemalan community. PBSUCCESS relied on the American news
media’s willingness to accept U.S. intervention as an anti-communist effort.112 Articles in
leading U.S. publications including Reader’s Digest, the Chicago Tribune, and The New York
Times painted disturbing portraits of the dangers in “communist” Guatemala.113
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The CIA attempted to convince the Guatemalan people that an underground resistance of
communists planned to overthrow the Arbenz administration.114 First, the Agency partnered with
the CEUA student group, an existing anti-communist student network, to create rumors of
insurgency. A declassified document reveals that CIA operative Donald Hediger approached two
members of the CEUA with a cover story that he “knew of a group of American and Guatemalan
business men who were willing and anxious to financially contribute to an anti-communist
campaign in Guatemala.”115 With this fabrication, Hediger garnered support from the student
group and created an entity known as the “Organizaciones Anti-Comunistas Unidas.”116 CEUA
students dominated the OAU. The CIA dominated the students. This intervention disguised the
role of the CIA operatives, who took “no part in the overt operations” of the propaganda
campaign.117
With the support of the CEUA students, CIA operatives invented the “Organization of the
Militant Godless” in an effort to garner the support of religious Catholics. A declassified
memorandum written by LINCOLN operation Chief of Staff discusses how the CIA “might best
exploit their resources” for the propaganda campaign.118 Eventually, CEUA students grew
fearful and resigned their participation, but by then, the CIA had already developed a clandestine
radio campaign and provided Gen. Castillo Armas the resources to release propaganda leaflets
from an aircraft into the Guatemalan capital.119
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To disguise CIA involvement, the Agency placed the clandestine radio station in
Nicaragua after determining that the “site is both technically feasible and politically tenable.”120
The Agency launched the radio station Voz de la Liberación seven weeks prior to the invasion.
The propaganda campaign and psychological pressure created the intended fear and panic that
Castillo Armas’ rebel forces were spreading across Guatemala.121 The propaganda campaign
allowed the CIA to create their version of reality; Guatemala was a repressive communist regime
in desperate need of intervention and support.
The CIA’s overt diplomatic initiatives began a few years prior. In 1951, the U.S.
restricted its own sale of arms to Guatemala, and blocked deals from Canada, Germany, and
Rhodesia.122 However, overt pressure climaxed at the 1954 Inter-American Conference. The
Conference convened to address economic matters, but Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
used the occasion to create an anti-communist resolution directed at Guatemala.123 Prior to
serving as President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, Dulles was an attorney for UFCO. During
this period, Dulles’ brother, Allen Dulles, served as Director of the CIA. The resolution called
for “hemispheric unity and mutual defense against ‘communist aggression,’” and provided a
roadmap for future interventions. 124 This broad initiative justified U.S. intervention in any Latin
American country where the U.S. identified a potential communist threat. Though the stated
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purpose of the Caracas Resolution was to protect the region against communism, the resolution
gave the U.S. the authority to defend their actions in PBSUCCESS.125
The CIA’s political program, referred to as the “K-Program,” intimidated the Guatemalan
army to support the CIA-backed anti-communist insurgency.126 The K-Program staffers at the
LINCOLN office drafted editorials to destabilize the Guatemalan military. The Agency
published articles like “A Time to Choose” which called on officers to “break their ties with the
government and offer their services to the rebellion ‘if they wish to share in the triumph over
communism.’”127 The K-Program reinforced perceptions that the anti-communist “liberation
forces” were supported by the U.S. In Shattered Hope, Piero Glessijes documents CIA
interventions. Guatemalan Colonel Ernesto Paiz Novales told Glessijes that the officers “were
under enormous pressure. The U.S. military mission even hinted that the U.S. would invade.”128
Despite this pressure, early efforts to recruit Guatemalan forces were unsuccessful.
The CIA shifted efforts to paramilitary action. Operatives recruited Guatemalan exiles
living in Honduras and Nicaragua to join the Liberation Army, El Ejército de Liberación. The
CIA handpicked Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a graduate of U.S. military training, to lead the
liberation forces.129 Howard Hunt recalled that Castillo Armas had no strong ideology, but that
“He had that good Indian look about him” and would be “malleable” to the CIA because he was
a “stupid man.”130 Hunt’s assessment is telling. The CIA did not choose a capable leader,
inclined and qualified to bring Guatemala to thriving democracy. Rather, the U.S. selected a
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mediocre leader who would defer to the CIA. Originally, Castillo Armas’ forces served as a
psychological weapon: an explicit warning of U.S. military power.131 However, the paramilitary
threat forced President Arbenz to make a critical decision.
Recall that the United States had imposed an arms embargo on Guatemala and convinced
other countries to collaborate. The legitimate Guatemalan government knew that its military
strength had diminished. Fearful of an impending invasion, Arbenz purchased five million U.S.
dollars’ worth of ammunition from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet-controlled state.132 The Swedish
ship Alfhem carried the Czech ammo to Puerto Barrios, within the Gulf of Honduras, on May 15,
1954. The CIA had long been waiting for an opportunity to justify invasion.133 That time had
arrived.
“If the [invasion] fails, the flag of the United States has failed,” President Eisenhower
told high-level PBSUCESS operatives on June 15, 1954.134 Just two days earlier, General
Castillo Armas traveled to Honduras to meet his force of CIA-trained mercenaries.135 The troops
were sent to small border towns in Honduras, outposts of United Fruit Company’s Honduran
division.136 While preparing to invade, the CIA still hoped to intimidate Arbenz into
submission.137 After a series of setbacks, CIA Director Allen Dulles convinced Eisenhower to
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send more planes into Guatemalan airspace, to intensify the perception of an impending
invasion. Dulles was correct; the airplane deployment demoralized Arbenz’ forces. Eventually,
the Guatemalan army gave Arbenz an ultimatum and proposed his resignation. On June 27, 1954
President Arbenz addressed the country:
Guatemala is enduring a most difficult trial. For fifteen days a cruel war against
Guatemala has been underway. The United Fruit Company, in collaboration with the
governing circles of the United States is responsible for what is happening to us…138
At the conclusion of his broadcasted address, President Arbenz resigned. On September 1, 1954,
Carlos Castillo Armas disembarked from a U.S. airplane to become the new President of
Guatemala.

Part IV: The Aftermath of the Coup d’état
Prior to the 1940s, economic control had been the primary lever by which the U.S.
exerted influence over Guatemala. The years before and during the coup saw the addition of
military influence as well, under the guise of anti-communist efforts.
While many examinations of U.S.-Latin American relations point to the Cold War as the
reason for U.S intervention in Guatemala, scholar Jorge Dominguez argues that the purpose of
U.S. political and military intervention was economic all along.139 Dominguez asserts that the
U.S. focused on maintaining dominance, often using illogical methods to effect political aims.
He classifies methods as illogical because they were “extremely costly” or “inappropriate
instruments” to achieve success. The Eisenhower administration adopted anti-communist
rhetoric to justify military intervention to overthrow a democratic process. Underlying this
138
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exercise of power was a desire, in the words of the State Department, “to install and sustain a
pro-U.S. government.”140
What was the real threat of the Guatemalan Revolution? As he insisted in his resignation
address, President Arbenz posed a threat to the prosperity of the United Fruit Company and U.S.
monopolistic control. Susanne Jonas contends, “The overthrow of Arbenz is one of the clearest
examples in modern history of U.S. policy being affected by direct ties of public officials to
private interests.”141 American journalists and historians published in the late 1950s have
corroborated the claim that U.S. actions were motivated by the corporate interests of UFCO: “If
the United Fruit Company had not existed there would have been no U.S. pressure or
intervention. The U.S. wouldn’t have cared…there would have been no problems.”142
Whether the U.S. actions were purely anti-communist or motivated by economic
interests, the effects of the 1954 coup were significant and long-lasting. First, the “liberation”
removed Guatemala’s democratically-elected President. Second, the intervention ended the
policies of the “ten-years of springtime,” aimed to promote greater equality among Guatemalan
citizens. Third, the coup reinstated military rule “turning the country into a literal hell-on-earth,
which has been maintained by regular U.S. intervention.”143 Finally, the coup impacted the
optimism of the Guatemalan people, who hoped for a brighter future for the rural working
population. Susanne Jonas states succinctly: “The reversal of the revolution and its land reform
set the stage for the 40 years of turbulence.”144
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Developing Counterinsurgency and the Guatemalan Civil War
Part I: Not a Showcase for Democracy, but a Laboratory for Repression: 1954-1963
After the CIA overthrew Arbenz in 1954, Washington promised that it would turn
Guatemala into a “showcase for democracy.” Instead, the U.S. created a laboratory of
repression.145 General Castillo Armas could not maintain control of the government, so the U.S.
continued to intervene directly through political procedures and economic aid.146 In July 1957,
President Castillo Armas was assassinated by a member of the palace guard with leftist
sympathies. His military clique, who had united as the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional
(MLN), kept the governmental power in their hands.147
Military and military-backed rule became the norm in Guatemala. General Miguel
Ydigoras Fuentes assumed the presidency in 1958. At first, he received admiration from the
Guatemalan public. This trust faded when he resumed open relations with the United States,
allowing U.S. instructors to train Cuban exiles on Guatemalan soil.148 Increasing dissatisfaction
with non-representative government led to massive student and labor protests, and the formation
of the Rebel Armed Forces—the beginning of a guerilla insurgency.149 President Ydigoras
Fuentes called for an election the following year. Juan Jose Arévalo announced that he would
return from exile to run for president.150 Seventeen months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
United States had a different plan. Concerned that Jose Arévalo would institute policies
unsupportive of the United States, the U.S. military backed a second coup d’état. Ydigoras
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Fuentes resigned the presidency. On March 31st, 1963, U.S-backed Colonial Enrique Perlata
Azurdia became the next President of Guatemala.151
In general, historians emphasize the coup of 1954, and deemphasize the coup of 1963. In
my view, this imbalance misses significant aspects of Guatemalan history. First, Arévalo’s
attempt to return to leadership represented a fleeting moment of hope for the Guatemalan public.
Instead, Azurdia’s installation resulted in more suffering. The evolution of the military
dictatorship under Perlata Azurdia represents a turning point towards increased brutality. Further,
during the Castillo Armas and Ydigoras Fuentes presidencies, the working and rural classes grew
increasingly outraged over economic injustice. The people’s frustration led to formations of
guerilla networks who were willing to use force to advocate for their needs. Tone deaf to the
movement for autonomy across Central America, the U.S. government continued to advance its
own interests and ignore the suffering of the rural, largely indigenous majority. With the
“laboratory for repression” established, Perlata Azurdia acted as an agent for increased tyranny.

Part II: The Counterinsurgency and Civil War Heighten
President and dictator Perlata Azurdia supported increasing levels of violence by the
Guatemalan military, while opening the door for increased U.S. military influence. During the
first years of his dictatorship, he utilized his military power against the developing guerilla
forces; however, he could not gain control of the emerging guerrilla insurgency.152 In 1966,
Perlata Azurdia permitted another election. Julio Cesar Mendes Montenegro became president in
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March 1966.153 Fearful of the Guatemalan military and pressured by the U.S., President
Montenegro agreed to station U.S. Green Berets in Guatemala.154 He signed a pact brokered by
the U.S. Embassy to develop the Guatemalan army’s counterinsurgency techniques in return for
economic aid.155 Montenegro named Carlos Arana Osorio as the new military commander in the
Zacapa province, the center of increasing guerilla activity.156
On December 3, 1966, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Guatemala, Viron Vaky,
forwarded a secret cable to SOUTHCOM Commander-in-chief General Porter. The cable
described a request by the Guatemalan Vice Defense Minister for U.S. “assistance in covert
training special squads to kidnap certain selected individuals.”157 Porter declined the request, but
stated that the U.S. will “fully support current police improvement programs and [will] initiate
military psychological warfare training and additional counter-insurgency operations training.”
Porter also made clear that the U.S. government “stand[s] ready [to] assist in every way possible
in training Guatemalan armed forces in fields [of] military psyops and CI operations.”158
Commander Carlos Arana Osorio sent his men to train with U.S. Green Berets in counterinsurgency warfare.159 The United States, now directly involved in counterinsurgency operations,
claimed their intention was to “professionalize” the military.160 The basic training provided by
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U.S. operatives put members of the Guatemalan army through a set of exercises intended to
remove their humanity. Greg Grandin in his text Empire’s Workshop details the type of training:
“they were beaten, degraded, made to bathe in sewage and then forbidden to wash the feces off
their bodies. Some were required to raise puppies, only to be ordered to kill them and drink their
blood […].”161 The CEH report contends that the training was focused on “extreme combat
situations,” which included torture techniques and simulated destruction of civilian villages.162
The goal of the U.S. government in providing military training was two-fold. According
to a declassified document assessing the “Public Safety Program” the U.S. government’s goals
included: first improve and provide “support to the armed and police forces in order […] to face
the threat posed by violent opposition;” and second, “to ensure that the United States maintains
its influence over the military establishment, which occupies an important position in the
Guatemalan political structure.”163 To the “satisfaction of the Americans” the Guatemalan
government, led by Arana Osorio, unleashed a new technique against the guerillas: the death
squads.164
The first sustained campaign of death-squad “disappearances” occurred in 1966. The
Guatemalan military unit tasked with inflicting terror was trained and directly supervised by U.S.
security advisers.165 During the Montenegro presidency, the U.S. provided substantial financial
assistance to the Guatemalan police: over 2.6 million dollars in instruction and equipment.166 By
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1970, over 30,000 Guatemalan police had received training through the U.S. Office of Public
Safety.167 The New York Times reported that the U.S. government was pleased to have finally
found a “willing partner [to] accomplish things with.”168 The partnership between the U.S. and
Arana Osorio led to the death of thousands of people, including many women and children.169
In 1970, the military helped Arana Osorio become the next “democratically” elected
president. After his election, he worked to “exterminate all opposition.”170 During Arana
Osorio’s presidency, levels of state-sanctioned murder increased; reported numbers range
between 3,500 and15,000.171 In 1974, the moderate political sector proposed General Rios Montt
as a candidate for the presidency. Although Montt won the election, Arana Osorio blocked his
inauguration and installed General Eugenio Lauguerd Garcia as president. Following this
inauguration, a new round of guerilla activity rose and solidified into the Ejército Guerrillero de
los Pobres (EGP).172 Another fraudulent election occurred in 1978, and Gen. Romeo Lucas
Garcia assumed the presidency with the intention to implement a “harsh campaign against the
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Guerillas.”173 An article published in Campeñero, the international magazine of the EGP,
reported that the government had abandoned all efforts to alleviate the state of repression.
Instead, Lucas Garcia turned to the Reagan Administration for aid. According to the EGP
authors, the “public support voiced by the U.S. government has already resulted in a newly
aggressive attitude on the part of the security forces which […] have increased the terror
campaign against ever-widening sectors of the population, including respected journalists and
world-renowned intellectuals.”174
As the 1980s began, the country remained in terror. The active military enrollment was
above 14,000 and the U.S.-trained death squads “reached into every sector of national life.”175
Military leaders, encouraged by the Reagan administration, launched a series of devastating
military sweeps in large areas of the countryside deemed as pro-guerilla.176 In 1981, the
Guatemalan military organized the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC). The PACs consisted of
unified civilian groups trained to carry out tasks for the army; the PAC groups generated
heightened terror. The PACs forcibly recruited civilian men out of their communities, leaving
women in increased danger from both the army forces and the guerilla insurgents. Also, the PAC
groups embedded violence within the community. Civilians were forced to participate in the
massacres, and commit acts of torture, mutilation, and destruction. The PACS converted “victims
into victimizers.”177 In modern Guatemalan history, the period of the early 1980s is called “La
Violencia.”
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After the fraudulent 1982 election, General Efrain Rios Montt staged a coup, backed by
the United States.178 General Rios Montt, a member of the modernized Guatemalan army, had
received counterinsurgency training from U.S. forces.179 His military efforts enabled the
“Scorched Earth” campaign in the highlands. Rios Montt’s goal was to “drain the sea” of the
guerilla movement.180
A secret report sent to the State Department in late 1982 confirms U.S. knowledge of the
Scorched Earth campaign. The report entitled “Guatemala: Reports of Atrocities Mark Army
Gains,” discusses how the Guatemalan army has “improved its control over rural areas”
throughout the country. The report details Ríos Montt’s plan to apply the Scorched Earth policy
throughout the country. The U.S. acknowledges that the Scorched Earth policy is often
“accompanied” by “government troops [that] are regularly guilty of massacres, rape, and
mayhem.”181 A released report sent to the State Department almost a year prior acknowledges
that the U.S. government had been aware of brutal tactics for an extended period of time—
without any attempt to intervene. Dated mid-February 1982, the document details:
The commanding officers of the units involved have been instructed to destroy all towns
and villages which are cooperating with the Guerilla Army of the Poor and eliminate all
sources of resistance…since the operation began, several villages have been burned to the
ground, and a large number of guerillas and collaborators have been killed…the army
high command is highly pleased with the initial results of the sweep operation.182
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Susanne Jonas writes, “There is no more painful chapter in the history of modern
Guatemala than the events of 1980-83.”183 United States officials’ had concrete knowledge about
the atrocities committed in Guatemala; their level of awareness is undeniable. Actions during the
Civil War, a genocide, even received support from the highest level of the U.S. government. A
New York Times article from December 7, 1982 reported a conversation between President
Reagan and General Rios Montt, which occurred on December 5, 1982. President Reagan told
reporters that Rios Montt was a “man of great integrity” and “totally dedicated to democracy.”184
President Reagan insinuated that General Rios Montt was the victim of unfounded accusations of
permitting human rights abuses. President Reagan stated that General Rios Montt received a
“bum rap” from human rights organizations185 President Reagan concluded his remarks with a
promise that the U.S. would do “what it can to support [Rios Montt’s] progressive efforts.''186
While President Reagan met with General Rios Montt, the killings escalated. A few
weeks earlier, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Bosworth wrote, “The military
continues to engage in massacres of civilians in the countryside…[our] Embassy recently
informed us of a new, apparently well-founded allegation of a large-scale killing of Indian men,
women and children in a remote area by the Army.” Bosworth concluded that Rios Montt “seems
either unwilling or unable to control this indiscriminate killing.”187 This memo directly
contradicts the public position.188 On the same day President Reagan proclaimed General Rios
Montt’s “integrity,” the Guatemalan Army “received orders to go to Las Dos Erres, a community
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that military intelligence considered to be sympathetic to the guerrillas.”189 The following
morning, Kaibil soldiers entered Las Dos Erres.190 Memoria De Silencio details the horrific
nature of the three-day event:
All of the minors were executed with blows from a sledgehammer to the head, while the
smallest ones were held by their feet and smashed against walls or trees. Then, they were
thrown down a well…on the nights of December 6 and 7, the soldiers again raped the
girls that were still alive as well as various women that they had divided among
themselves, ‘I could see how they fought for the minors to rape them’…On December 7,
the Kaibiles began indiscriminately killing men and women. Some were executed by
smashing their heads with a sledgehammer and others with firearms. Once the group of
Kaibiles had finished, they left Las Dos Erres and went through the mountains in the
direction of San Diego, La Técnica, close to the border with Mexico. The soldiers took
two girls, ages sixteen and fourteen from the last group of victims…when they became
bored with them, they strangled them...191
The massacre of Las Dos Erres is considered one of the most horrendous singular events of the
war. The destruction of the entirety of Dos Erres cannot be read in isolation. The Report asserts
that the events were the “culmination of combined acts of intelligence, displacement, and
control.” As President Reagan, aware of the human rights abuses occurring in Guatemala, gave
General Rios Montt public praise for his integrity, General Rios Montt provided the approval for
the inhumane destruction of an entire community. This event could not have occurred without
the knowledge “of the [U.S.] army’s high command.”192
After information surfaced about the Las Dos Erres massacre, U.S. officials decided to
investigate. The U.S. Guatemalan Embassy sent a secret cable to the State Department on
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December 28, 1982 that explained the Embassy had learned through a “reliable” source of a
“possible GOG army massacre of 200 villagers of los Dos R’s.”193 The source told the Embassy,
“On the eve of December 12, an army unit disguised as Guerillas entered los Dos R’s.”194 The
cable provided the State Department with a few theories for why the village appeared destroyed,
but there were no signs of human bodies. The author speculated that perhaps the “army killed
everyone in the village, dumped them in the well, and covered the well over.”195 Because the
Embassy trusted the source, the office decided to investigate further. On December 31st the
Embassy sent a second secret cable to the State Department after their visit to Las Dos Erres.
Although the pilot who brought the Embassy officials refused to land the helicopter in the ruins
of the village, the officials reported that they saw “all of the houses in the area had been deserted;
many had been razed or destroyed by fire."196 The Embassy concluded that “the party most likely
responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army."197 These two cables provide direct insight
into the level of U.S. awareness of the massacre.
The Guatemalan Civil War continued through the 1980s. Declassified materials have
revealed the extent of U.S. recognition of the widespread atrocities through the years of the war.
In a declassified State Department report dated March 28, 1986 a Department Official gives an
unusually transparent description of the use of “forced disappearance” in Guatemala. The author
contends, "While criminal activity accounts for a small percentage of the cases, and from time to
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time individuals ‘disappear’ to go elsewhere, the security forces and paramilitary groups are
responsible for most kidnappings. Insurgent groups do not now normally use kidnapping as a
political tactic."198 The document provides direct evidence of the Guatemalan Army’s
engagement in brutal violence through the previous ten years. The official shields the reality that
these “disappearances” are acts of brutal murder but acknowledges U.S. awareness. The
document argues that the State Department and U.S. Embassy "have failed in the past to
adequately grasp the magnitude of the problem" of forced disappearance.199
Another declassified report shows the extent of U.S. knowledge of and involvement in
the atrocities. Terry Ward directed CIA operations in Latin America from 1989 to 1993. The
report sent by the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board notes that during Chief Ward’s
tenure, the CIA provided monetary assistance to the Guatemalan military intelligence services
valued at $1 to $3.5 million per year. Even after the U.S. terminated overt military aid, the CIA
continued to send “vital” funds to the Guatemalan army whose human rights records "were
generally known to have been reprehensible by all who were familiar with Guatemala."200 The
Board learned “that in the period since 1984, several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have
ordered, planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as assassination,
extrajudicial execution, torture, or kidnapping while they were assets—and that the CIA was
contemporaneously aware of many of the allegations." The report recognizes that this knowledge
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of human rights abuses was not limited to the CIA; the report asserts that “US policy-makers
knew of both the CIA's liaison with them and the services' unsavory reputations.”201
Although there were exceptions, many government officials denied knowledge of
systematic violence. A U.S. Embassy study reveals that the government took great efforts to
reject identification of the Guatemalan army as the primary force of brutality. Through this
denial, the U.S. disavowed the link between the violence and U.S. involvement. The study
outlines the levels of violence, but concludes:
Our Embassy does not really know who is responsible for the killings in rural Guatemala
[…] It is to my mind a proof of this situation that Embassy Guatemala has said for
several months that it believes the Army is responsible for major human rights violations,
but has not advised reported in any cable a single instance that it believes was done by
the Army.202 (Emphasis from original document)
In 1996, the Guatemalan government signed Peace Accords which officially ended the
Civil War. The War lasted a total of 36 years. More than 200,000 people were murdered; eightythree percent were from indigenous backgrounds. Roughly ninety-three percent of the crimes
were committed by military personnel and other government-connected groups. More than 440
villages were entirely destroyed.203 The events of the War have been labeled a genocide.

Part III: The War’s Effect on Guatemalan Women
Genocide intentionally destroys culture and community. The horrors committed during a
genocide move beyond war; genocide is the devaluation of innocent people not tied to politics or
power. Victoria Sanford argues that genocide is a gendered atrocity, meaning that acts of
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violence often target reproductive capacity to end the existence of a population. For this reason,
women are principal targets of genocidal violence.204
During the most brutal period of the war, La Violencia, the army committed uniquely
horrific acts of violence against women. The CEH report notes that roughly 25% of the direct
victims of violence during the War were women, who were raped, tortured, or murdered because
of political ideology and social engagement.205 The final statistics from the CEH registered 9,411
female victims of sexual violence, and 1,465 cases of rape.206 An even greater number of women
were indirect victims: mothers lost children, and wives became widows as a result of the
violence.207 While women were not the majority of the victims of the Civil War, women were
victimized in ways that correspond to their gender and sexuality, as well as “their identity as
bearers and protectors of a community’s culture and future.”208
Violence aimed at women was specifically brutal. Targeting women effectively destroyed
the entire community. The military viewed women during the War “as a threat based on the
conception of females’ moral fragility and women’s roles as primary reproducers of society.”209
Almost one hundred percent of the crimes of sexual nature were committed against women; one
official commented that it would be a challenge “to find a Mayan girl of 11 to 15 who had not
been raped.”210 The CEH report found that soldiers were specifically trained in sexual
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violence.211 Soldiers used rape as an “element of war” that made women’s bodies into active
symbols of aggression.212 Rape was the most frequent form of abuse. In Michele L. Leiby’s
examination of the CEH report, she determined that rape comprised approximately 84% of all
sexual violations during the War; the military committed roughly 70% of the acts of rape.213
Sexual assault was not a random event. Women were deliberately chosen by the perpetrators.
The orders to attack were often given by high commanders of the military prior to entering the
community.214
The commander has his group of killers, and he tells them how they have to kill. Today
they are going to behead or hang them, today they are going to rape all the women. Many
times, orders are given to the soldiers before they go out...They were also ordered to do
the percha...where 20 or 30 soldiers would rape a single woman.215
Today we are going to slash throats and finish them off with wires, today we are going to
rape all of the women, and kick them viciously, later we will put our guns in their rectum
or vagina.216
The CEH report found evidence that soldiers were punished if they didn’t participate in these
acts of brutality.217
Sexual violence effectively instilled mass fear throughout Guatemala. Soldiers used
systematic rape as a form of torture that caused community destruction. Soldiers turned rape into
an act of communal shame by making the aggressions public. Military forces would deface the
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bodies of their victims and put them on display to draw an audience.218 Members of the
community were forced to view the victims of rape: “She was raped by I don't know how many
soldiers, they cut out her tongue, cut off her ears and eyes, they cut off her breasts and left her by
a rock...They left her impaled and naked body…what was left of her body.”219 Forcing the
community to view acts of rape in this way undermined male masculinity. Further, using rape to
create terror “reinforces feelings of vulnerability that the agents of politically motivated violence
hoped to instill.”220 Rape became a tool to assert dominance over women, and to create a general
sense of powerlessness. The acts of sexualized violence led to profound suffering for the direct
victims as well as their families, spouses and entire communities.221
During the War, women were also directly targeted as victims of torture. The Guatemalan
army committed eighty-eight percent of the crimes of torture.222 Often, the army killed their
victims following prolonged acts of torture. For women, torture often included the use of sexual
violence. The army would keep women alive for longer periods of time in order to exaggerate
the acts of torture:
Women were kept in separate rooms where they were repeatedly raped and tormented.
One soldier after another would swagger into the places where the women were kept, and
then other soldiers would take their turn. This horror and humiliation would go on for
hours.223
The level of brutality within these acts of torture is notable. Women were treated with excessive
violence to send messages about their worth. Torture, carried out with specific intention to assert
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dominance and superiority, dehumanized women. Jennifer Harbury records the story of Anita, a
woman who joined the URNG.224 Anita describes her discovery of her friend and colleague
Melissa, who had been providing medical support for guerilla insurgents:
She was naked and battered, her face bluish from strangulation, small razor cuts and
cigarette burns up and down her arms and legs. Her autopsy report showed vaginal
slashes, as if her captors, once finished with her themselves, had raped her with a broken
bottle. Her eyes were gone, the sockets filled with mud.225
Survivors of gender-based violence faced further victimization because of the cultural
practice of remaining quiet about the abuse. Most who survived extreme sexual violence chose
not to report their experiences because of the shame attached.226 The CEH document discusses
the challenges the Commission faced to find women survivors of violence who were willing to
discuss their experiences. In many cases, this silence has continued into modern day.227 Women
told the Commission for Historical Clarification that:
I have never spoken about how the soldiers raped the women, much less that they had
also abused me . . . I am going to the grave with this . . . No one can know . . . My
children don’t know, El Señor doesn’t know . . . No one knows . . . It is not easy for a
woman to dare to mention that she was raped…228
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The hesitation to report acts of sexualized violence is evident even in the testimonies that women
agreed to provide. Women utilized “qualifying euphemisms” to talk about their experience.
Instead of using the word “violar” to refer to rape, survivors or witnesses of rape would use
words like “pasar” or “usar.”229 Because of the prevalence to choose silence, the Guatemalan
army’s acts of sexual violence continue to degrade women.
Women fell victim to specific acts of violence, including rape and torture because of their
reproductive capacity and their role within the community. Targeting women for egregious acts
of violence paralyzed the entire community with fear. Women faced the constant threat of
violence, and men were humiliated and emasculated by watching their wives, daughters, and
mothers raped or beaten. Gender-based violence became a powerful tool for domination. The
pervasive use of violence during the Civil War normalized two generations of Guatemalan men
to sexual and physical violence as tools to assert and consolidate power over women.230 In the
words of one indigenous woman survivor from Polochic, Guatemala:
You could say I’m lucky to be here to talk to you. So many sisters didn’t survive, they
were tortured for so long. I was the victim of kidnapping, of torture. Soldiers passed over
my body; they played with my body—and not just with me. And it hasn’t stopped, our
bodies are still used to torture and divide our communities.231
The great harms perpetrated during the Civil War continue to live in the minds of many
Guatemalans; the War is considered a root cause for much of the violence and crime that has
persisted since the war’s conclusion.232 The Civil War and resulting “cultural” acceptance of
extreme violence has had a decisive and enduring impact on the lives of women.
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Part IV: Moving into the 21st Century: Organized Crime and U.S. Involvement
With the signing of the Oslo accords, the conflict ended—but visible signs of the destruction
of Guatemalan society pervaded the landscape. Entire villages in rural communities were burned
to the ground. Stockpiles of weapons and ammunition contributed to the atmosphere of sustained
fear and violence. While the United States funded and distributed firearms during the years of
conflict, no one collected the instruments of violence at war’s end. Tens of thousands of former
combatants ended the war without jobs or land.233
A special report published by the Council on Foreign Relations connects the chaos in the
aftermath of the War to the subsequent rise in organized crime.234 After the sophisticated and
“professionalized” training received by the Guatemalan military, many officers turned to
participation in organized crime.235 The UNHCR, United Nations High Commission for
Refugees, reports that following the War, many prior military officials trained by the U.S.
consolidated into “Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses” (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos
Clandestinos de Seguridad, CIACS).236
In 1996, the same year Guatemala signed the Peace Accords that ended the Civil War, the
U.S. passed the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.”237 This Act led
to the deportation of thousands of “criminals” back to Central America—and specifically to

233

Richard Millett and Thomas Shannon Stiles, “Peace Without Security: Central America in the 21st Century,”
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2008), 36.
234
Michael Shifter, “Countering Criminal Violence in Central America,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special
Report No. 64 (April 2012), vii.
235
I use the term organized crime to refer to the illicit activities of non-state groups.
236
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing International
Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Guatemala,” U.N. Document No. HCR/EG/GTM/18/01 (Jan. 2018), 5.
237
This new policy banned U.S. officials from disclosing criminal backgrounds. Therefore, the new governments
unaware of potentially violent pasts. Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs took Central America,” The Council on
Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May-June 205), 100.

64
fragile, post-war Guatemala.238 The UNHCR notes that Guatemala had already experienced a
subculture of violent street gangs, but the U.S. decision to deport immigrants intensified this
situation. Many of the “criminals” considered themselves American and had lived the majority of
their lives on U.S. soil. Their families migrated to the U.S. during the years of the Civil War.239
In the prisons of Los Angeles, these young men learned the culture of California street gangs.
Deported back to Guatemala, they took these lessons with them.240 The U.S. prisons acted as a
“criminal finishing school” and created a transnational gang network. The deported gang
members consolidated Guatemalan street gangs and created a hierarchy reflecting the structure in
the U.S.241 The new gangs assumed control of neighborhoods throughout the country and linked
these novel organized crime groups to the rival international gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13)
and Barrio-18.
Conclusion
“Guatemala is still paying for the American ‘success.’” – Piero Glessijes 242
This chapter has traced the history of social, political, and economic conflict in Guatemala. I
have focused specific attention on the U.S. role in creating and facilitating violence, as well as
perpetuating the effects of instability. Throughout the decades of violence, the United States
intervened to escalate conflict, and contributed to a pervasive culture of violence. This culture
has outlasted the brutal 36-year Civil War.
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In the imbalanced relationship between the U.S. and Guatemala, the U.S. exercised
paternalistic control. The U.S. emphasized superiority through economic measures and political
involvement, and then transitioned to active military training and engagement. The United States
government’s stated reason for political intervention can be loosely traced back to the events of
the “Ten Years of Springtime” and a developing “revolutionary” platform. As the Arévalo and
Arbenz governments became more liberal, the U.S. raised fears of a developing communist
takeover. In reality, the monopolistic interest of the United Fruit Company and the loss of
economic and political control provided much of the motivation for U.S. action. As Stephen
Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer state, “the forcible interruption of the Guatemalan political
process […] has remained the central episode in the modern history of the country.”243 The
events of the 1954 coup stimulated years of volatility that culminated in the Civil War.
Ronald Schneider, a leading historian of the 1954 coup, conceded that “while the short run
outcome of the intervention in 1954 was viewed at the time as a success for the U.S. in the Cold
War, in a larger perspective it is increasingly difficult to see it as such.”244 The United States
made the explicit decision to turn a blind eye to the rising levels of violence, feigning ignorance
to maintain control. The United States military may not have directly committed murder—or
ordered Guatemalan soldiers to slaughter, rape, burn, and decimate the indigenous and rural
populations—but “the U.S. armed the murderers.”245
The impact of the coup, counterinsurgency, and Civil War pertains to the current climate of
the Guatemalan state. Today, politically motivated violence is understood as a “cultural fact,”246
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and the cycle of violence is “traceable to the bitter hostilities engendered by PBSUCCESS.”247
The Guatemalan military—backed by U.S. support—has shown a generation of Guatemalans
that terror and murder are “appropriate ways to achieve both political and personal ends.”248 In
Guatemala, violence is perceived as normal and natural.249
The atrocities and violence of the Civil War, along with the War’s legacy of continuing
violence, explain the choice for migration, especially among Guatemalan women. According to a
report by the Migration Policy Institute, Guatemalan migration served as a “response valve” to
the events of the Civil War.250 Following the gruesome war, migration expanded in response to
“Guatemala’s severe and continuing socioeconomic problems, successive natural disasters,
increasing social violence — and a weak state, lacking the vision, capacity, and resources to
resolve these problems internally.”251As the post-war era continued, the “extreme structural
violence” caused many to be “forcefully displaced” or to attempt migration.252
Would Guatemala have a different history without U.S intervention? Throughout this
lengthy history, there have been moments of possible change—brief glimpses of a departure
from corruption. If the U.S. had not intervened in 1954, Arbenz’s liberal platform might have
promoted greater equality among Guatemalan ladinos and indigenos. In 1963, the U.S. prevented
Arevalo’s effort to return to the presidency. The U.S. replaced a man who represented a chance
for reform with a man who increased violent terror. During the Civil War, the U.S. government
might have used their authority to bring attention to the grave human rights abuses. Instead, the
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U.S forces trained the Guatemalan army with tactics of great brutality. American presidents
continued to pay lip service to a human rights agenda while covertly sending aid and munitions
in support of a genocide. Reflecting on the history of U.S. intervention illuminates how selfdescribed American superiority and a desire to dominate Central America allowed for continued
violence.
With few exceptions, the U.S. government and the general public have denied
responsibility for almost a century of direct and indirect interference in Guatemalan society. The
“great silence” about the events in Guatemala creates separation and lack of culpability.253 By
“suppressing” and “silencing” this brutal history, the U.S. remains in a position of power and
putative moral superiority. Recall Mayblin’s concept of differential humanity: due to colonial
histories, different bodies are assigned different levels of worth. The actions of U.S. intervention
highlighted in this chapter showcase the colonially informed ideas of the U.S. government about
Guatemalan people—a people of “differential worth,” undeserving of democracy, freedom, or
safety. The history of U.S. intervention in Guatemala and the current asylum system perform
similar acts of paternal posturing. The U.S., acting as the higher power, decides how history
plays out and disregards the creation and amplification of violence. The paternalistic nature of
asylum must be viewed in recognition of this lengthy history. The United States history of power
in Central American informs the perspective of U.S. officials who believe they have the right to
judge and determine the destiny of others who are less fortunate.
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CHAPTER III: THE SYSTEM OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA
Colonial Roots, Civil War Exacerbation, and an Inadequate Legal System
According to a 2019 New York Times report, every week Guatemalan newspapers address
stories of mutilation, gruesome torture, and acts of dehumanization perpetrated against
women.254 These reports of violence echo the systematic violence of the Civil War. As
articulated in the previous chapter, women experienced acts of violence during the War that
targeted their gender. The grave harms against women extended beyond the signing of the Peace
Accords in 1996.255 Following the War, the social fabric of Guatemala “broke down.”256 The
United States had trained Guatemalan soldiers to commit acts of killing and torture. When the
War concluded, the military sent these men back to their communities without a plan to
reincorporate them into society: “One day these men were encouraged to commit violence in the
name of the state, the next, they were sent back to civilian communities which were in many
ways unprepared for their return.”257
The Civil War normalized gender-based violence.258 Claudia Paz y Paz, the first woman
Attorney General of Guatemala, explained: “Guatemala’s history of militarism, genocide and
war crimes bears a direct relationship to the current vulnerability of women […].”259 David
Carey Jr. and M. Gabriella Torres study the cadavers of female victims of violence. They found
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that the bodies of victims in contemporary Guatemala display evidence of rape, extreme torture
and murder that are reminiscent of cadaver reports published during the War.260 The Guatemalan
organization Fundación Sobrevivientes released a report that postulated that the same people
responsible for contemporary violence were responsible for wartime atrocities. The “sense of
power” displayed by the perpetrator is a “unifying factor” between the modern and wartime acts
of violence.261
Many scholars and legal advocates connect the continuation of brutal violence to the high
level of impunity for wartime crimes. Although the War ended after the government signed the
Peace Accords, crimes against women, and especially crimes against indigenous women, remain
unsolved.262 The War enabled generations of Guatemalans to use acts of violence as a means for
control; the War’s conclusion created systemic impunity.263 The Truth Commission written
report establishes that the perpetrators of 99% of war crimes against women have never faced
trial.264 Paula Barrios, a Guatemalan lawyer who represents female survivors of violence,
highlights the top-down mechanism of impunity: “The interest of successive Guatemalan
governments has always been to remain silent—to make us unaware of what really happened and
forget the massacres or the sexual violence committed against women as a weapon of war.”265
The impunity for Civil War violence facilitates modern brutality.266 Despite her efforts and
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actions during her tenure as AG, Paz y Paz declares that it continues “to be very dangerous to be
a woman in Guatemala.”267
In this chapter, I focus on the ways in which the creation and systemic nature of genderbased violence within Guatemala corresponds to patterns of migration. I address the types of
violence experienced by women in Guatemala, and the connection these forms of violence have
to legacies of colonialism. Next, I explore the development of unequal societal power structures
formalized in the Guatemalan Civil Code. I also highlight the development and execution of
machista culture, a system based on male superiority. Although the Government has attempted to
protect women from gender-based violence, the laws created have roots in a system of power
that devalues women. Despite the high levels of gender-based violence throughout the country,
failure to properly investigate and prosecute crimes has led to widespread impunity.
The continuation of violence with high levels of impunity are essential to understanding why
women flee Guatemala to seek protection in the United States. However, while the conditions
that cause an individual to seek asylum are profound, many analyses rely too heavily on this lens.
During asylum cases, judges will often overemphasize these country conditions to either
disregard individual experiences of violence or position the violence as specifically pervasive in
Guatemala—which gives the U.S. the chance to act as a paternal protector. I highlight Civil War
violence—and specifically the violent training of men in the military, paramilitary, and the
patrullas de autodefensa civil (civil self-defense patrols)—as a way of reinforcing the connection
between the wartime influence of the United States, and contemporary levels of violence.
Perpetrators of violent acts against women seek to enact control over the victims.
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When possible, this thesis employs the phrase gender-based violence as opposed to violence
against women. I use this terminology in an effort to expand my understanding of forms of
violence. However, much of the formal legislation in Guatemala uses the phrase violence against
women. Agana Chatterji, Shashi Buluswar, and Mallika Kaur explain that “Gendered violence
targets all non-dominantly gendered subjects regardless of their gender status (as cisgender or
transgender, multigender) or sexuality (as LGBTIQA).”268 The premise of gender-based violence
emphasizes that people of all genders can be victims; however, women experience gender-based
violence at disproportionately high rates.269 Amy Elman’s definition specifically addresses how
women are more affected by gender-based violence. She defines gender-based violence as
practices that “represent a violent reproduction of gender that specifically functions to enforce
and perpetuate female subordination.”270 Gender-based violence includes actions that are
physical and sexual, as well as actions that cause economic hardship or psychological pain
without physical harm.271 Finally, I choose to use this term to emphasize how gender-based
violence should operate as an “analytical category” to examine how actions are committed
through normative ideas of masculinity. 272 Using the term gender-based violence allows for
greater recognition of the influences of gender roles, and the enactment of gender stereotypes.
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Part I: Types of Violence Against Women
In the first six months of 2018, the Public Ministry received 21,400 reports of violence, in
a country of about 17 million people.273 On average, authorities receive 116 reports of genderbased violence every day.274 Gender-based violence in Guatemala takes on many forms. U.S.
professors Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh research the impacts of violence in
Latin America, and argue that three types of non-physical violence underlies, provokes, and
permits the physical kind.275 First, they define “structural” violence as high-level systems that
promote continued gender inequality. In Guatemala, structural violence presents within the
economy and labor system: women—especially indigenous, poor, and rural women—experience
severe disadvantages.276 The second form of violence is “political,” characterized by actions of
the State. Wartime violence falls into this category. “Symbolic” violence is the internalization of
inequality between men and women: acts of aggression or enactments of inequality that are
labeled as “everyday practices.”277 These practices include:
“Robadas” (women being ‘taken’ or ‘stolen’) as part of courtship; extreme control over
their bodies, social relations and physical movement; a social premium on their honor and
“good behavior”; the expectation that they will be partnered and be mothers…278
Symbolic forms of violence are often classified as part of the culture of a nation and are ignored
by the justice system.279 Symbolic violence perpetuates other acts of violence because it allows
injustice to become institutionalized. Those suffering, committing crimes, or interpreting and
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creating laws all live within the greater social structure that has allowed for a “we are used to it”
perspective.280
Recognizing the impact and development of non-physical violence helps to underscore
how acts of intense physical violence occur. Women in Guatemala are at risk for sexual violence,
including assault and rape, as well as physical violence that can result in murder. According to
the Crime and Safety reports published by the U.S. Department of State, sexual assault numbers
decreased from 613 in 2015, to 571 in 2016, to 551 in 2017 and then to 527 in 2018. The figure
for 2019 has not been published. However, the report acknowledges that the actual numbers are
almost certainly much higher.281 The IACHR reported different numbers based on data from the
Secretariat against Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Trafficking in Persons, a Guatemalan
governmental office. According to this report, the office recorded 7,845 denuncias (reports) of
sexual violence in 2015 and 7,949 denuncias in 2016.282
As of 2013, Guatemala had the third highest rate of femicide in the world.283 Sociologist
Diana Russell defined femicide in the late 1980s as the “the killing of females by males because
they are female.”284 Russell highlights that femicide is a “form of terrorism” because it generates
terror, reinforces male dominance, and renders “all women chronically and profoundly
unsafe.”285Acts of femicide often include a “shock factor” recalling the extreme brutality of the
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War. Mutilated and dismembered bodies of murdered women are often left on display in public
places.286 A majority of cases of femicide are seen in instances of intimate partner violence.287
Chazaro and Casey connect the rise in femicide in the early 2000s to the increased presence of
women in the public sphere, engaging in society outside of domestic work.288 A Guatemalan
non-profit, Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres reported 7,357 violent deaths between 2008 and
2017, with similar numbers in 2018 and 2019.289 Victims of femicide are often poor.290 Femicide
commonly follows months or years of sustained violence against a female victim.291
In the last few years, the spread of gangs throughout Guatemala has intensified the level
of violence in the cities and in rural regions. With the increased activity of the 18th Street Gang
and MS13, unsafe conditions for women have intensified. Gang members often force women
into relationships, or rival gangs will target women because of previous relationships with gangaffiliated men.292 Sometimes, women are assaulted and killed by gang members as a
demonstration to prove their masculinity and receive a promotion within the gang.293 The
Advocates for Human Rights in Guatemala found that women who “come into contact with
gangs are subject to threats, kidnapping, extortion, rape and sexual assault, and
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murder.”294Women in Guatemala face multiple levels of violence on a day-to-day basis. I discuss
the roots and proliferation of this hierarchy of power in the following section.
Part II: The Roots of Violence and The Legal Framework
The Civil Code
Male dominance and gender-based violence were not clear features of ancient
Mesoamerica. In fact, anthropological research suggests that women and men played fairly equal
roles in society, except for a few ancient Mayan cities that had matrilineal power structures.
Patriarchy was a colonial import. Lynn Stephen explains how modern violence “indirectly
replay[s] crucial colonial and postcolonial tropes.”295 Colonizers exerted their control over the
indigenous populations through physical as well as political acts; for example, Spanish
colonizers raped Mayan women. Lynn Stephen writes:
Since the arrival in 1519 of Cortés and his troops in what is now Mexico, the subjugation
of indigenous identity, the feminization of indigenous men through domination by other
men, the conquest of indigenous women and men through sexual assault and coercion
have been standard practices… 296
Both men and women were affected by acts of brutality that stripped men of their masculinity,
and victimized women. Acts of colonial aggression enforced the idea that women’s bodies could
be abused and manipulated as a method of exerting power. Stephen continues, “Historically,
indigenous women have been projected as ‘available’ to outsiders and invading military
forces.”297 Identifying the indigenous population as inferior through acts of physical and sexual
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violence became a common practice. Colonialism reinforced a dominant relationship between
the powerful and the subordinate that used political control and acts of violence to maintain
superiority. Former AG Claudia Paz y Paz affirms the connection between the development of
patriarchal relationships during colonization and modern violence in Guatemala.298
The roots of colonial practices are evident in the Guatemalan Civil Code. The Civil Code
contains strict provisions that served as scaffolding for a society dominated by patriarchal
conditions. Certain elements directly disadvantage women. Specific parts of the Family Code,
including the marriage and divorce laws, have handcuffed modern legislation, in both
interpretation and implementation.299 What follows is a limited sample of the laws that facilitated
the creation of unequal relationships between men and women.
As Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh explain, because the Family Code is
rooted in the idea that the “family unit” is the basis of society, seemingly neutral laws enable the
proliferation of gender inequality, “further normalizing and formalizing the symbolic violence of
such inequalities.”300 Article 113 of the Code states that “A woman will be permitted to work,
exercise a profession, or participate in industry or commerce, when her work does not interfere
with caring for the children, or her household responsibilities.”301 Similarly, Article 114
establishes that a husband may prohibit his wife from participating in activities outside of the
home. A husband need only provide sufficient evidence or justification that this work would

298

Claudia Paz y Paz, “Declaration of Guatemala Expert Claudia Paz y Paz,” 2016. Available online by
request through the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.
299
Menjívar and Walsh, “Subverting Justice: Socio-Legal Determinants of Impunity for Violence against Women in
Guatemala,” 8.
300
Menjívar and Walsh, “Subverting Justice: Socio-Legal Determinants of Impunity for Violence against Women in
Guatemala,” 8.
301
Original Spanish Text: La mujer podrá desempeñar un empleo, ejercer una profesión, industria, oficio o
comercio, cuando ello no perjudique el interés y cuidado de los hijos ni las demás atenciones del hogar. El
Gobierno de La República de Guatemala, El Codigo Civil, Art. 113 (1996).

77
jeopardize the well-being of the household.302 Article 169 states that only “innocent women” are
eligible for alimony following divorce.303 To prove innocence, women must show that they are
not at fault for the divorce and that they have maintained “good conduct.”304 Menjívar and Walsh
note that the provision to prove “good conduct” often leads men to continue to exert their control
by surveilling their ex-spouse. This type of monitoring may become the basis for violence—
including femicide.305 The Code does not contain similar provisions for a man’s behavior. The
Civil Code facilitated the establishment of a legal system that continued to support the existence
of gender inequality.
The patriarchal laws within the Code replicate colonial practices and ideology. Through
colonialism, the colonizer asserts superiority by labeling the colonized as inferior. The colonizer
rewrites laws and uses physical and sexual violence to legitimize their power.306 The Guatemalan
Civil Code echoes this structure through the creation of a system that establishes male
superiority. Through these acts of symbolic violence, men legitimize their power. The Civil Code
enshrines paternalistic thinking—transferring the power dynamic from colonizer and colonized,
to men and women. Although the government has appealed some of the laws within the Civil
Code, the legacy of state-sanctioned patriarchy endures.307 The aftermath of colonial superiority,
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and much of the Code, impacts the way that laws intended to protect women are interpreted,
often rendering them ineffective.
Domestic Legal Framework
After the Civil War, women’s rights groups mobilized to convince the Guatemalan
government to create legal protections against crimes of gender-based violence.308 Women’s
rights activists called on Congress to ratify the provisions within the Belém de Pará Convention,
a 1995 Inter-American Convention.309 All Latin American countries signed this international
convention.310 According to the provisions of the Belém de Pará Convention, women have the
right to live a life free of violence.311 The Convention called on signatory nations to create
legislation that would “prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women”312 Following the
Convention, the Guatemalan government faced challenges to create and implement legislation.
The political arena remained male-dominated.
In 1996, Guatemala became compliant with the Convention by passing the Law to
Prevent, Punish, and Eradicate Intra-familiar Violence (Nº 97-1996, passed November 28, 1996).
The law articulated legal actions to address domestic violence within the “family unit”—
including marriage, civil marriage, or people who have children together.313 The Law
specifically defined domestic violence as “any action or omission that in a direct or indirect
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[method] causes injury or physical, sexual, psychological or proprietary harm, as much as in the
public realm as in private […].”314 The new law enabled women to file for a protective order.315
However, these orders would only be enforced if the receiving agency—for instance, the
Ministerio Publico, Policia Nacional, or the Procuraduría General de la República—filed a
complaint to a court.316 The law did not criminalize domestic violence. Often the “receiving
agencies” failed to report the violence to the court systems, likely due to ingrained bias about
interpersonal violence.317 The 1996 law also put too much emphasis on the family unit. The law
did not criminalize all gender-based violence, it only indirectly addresses these harms.
Guatemalan attorney Hilda Morales Trujilo notes that this focus “upheld the hierarchy of the
family” which already had primary focus within the Civil and Criminal codes.318 Without
explicitly mentioning the vulnerability of women both within and outside the family, the law
accomplished little genuine protection.
In 2008, the Guatemalan government attempted to remedy the inequities within the Civil
Code and the inadequacy of the 1996 Law by passing the 2008 Law Against Femicide and Other
Forms of Violence Against Women. The 2008 Law had the aim of protecting the “life, liberty,
integrity, dignity, protection, and equality of all women before the law.”319 In addition to crimes
of a physical or sexual nature, the law included economic violence, defined as: “Restrictions on
disposing of one’s own property, forced signature on documents that affect property or liberate
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an aggressor from responsibilities, extortion denying economic support, infliction of violence in
order to control income.”320 Furthermore, the 2008 Law formally recognized femicide, the
murder of a woman “because of her condition as woman,” as a criminal offense.321 Originally,
the law established a prison sentence of 25-50 years without the possibility of parole.322 In
addition to recognizing new categories of violence as crimes, the law established Specialized
Courts for Violence Against Women as a method for addressing these crimes. Prosecutors,
judges, lawyers, social workers, and psychologists received specific training on how to handle
gender-based violence.323 On face value, these courts demonstrate a positive step in the direction
toward equality. However, the Specialized Court system contains essential flaws.
First, the ability to report violence remains limited. There are only eleven Specialized
Courts in Guatemala, although the country is divided into 22 departments. Women living in one
of the other eleven departments face great challenges to reach a court.324 Women in rural areas—
where the prevalence of femicide is higher—often live several hours from the nearest court. In
these remote areas, women rely on agentes, local authorities, who may report the crimes to the
National Civil Police (PNC).325 Although the 2008 Law established multiple pathways for
reporting violence, the PNC is most accessible for Guatemalan women. However, the police
commonly refrain from getting involved in gender-based violence cases that occur within the
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home.326 Police officers may share the sexist views of the abuser, or believe that intimate partner
violence does not merit the involvement of law enforcement.327 The Advocates for Human
Rights published an account of how the legal system failed one woman. She could not report the
abuse to the police because her husband, a police officer, informed her that if she involved the
police “there was nothing that would be done.”328 Because of the normalization of violence, and
the acceptance of female subordination as routine—the written law fails to support female
victims.
Second, legal mishaps restrict the ability of these laws to guarantee protection. While
both the 1996 and 2008 Laws attempted to criminalize behaviors in both public and private
contexts, the Laws were enacted outside the boundaries of both the Civil Code and the Criminal
Code. This structural problem limits the courts’ abilities to prosecute gender-based violence.329
Despite the provisions of the 2008 Law, rates of femicide in Guatemala have continued to
increase. In June of 2019, the Guatemalan government took a major step backwards, declaring
Article 6 of the Law “partially unconstitutional”.330 With this resolution, the government reduced
the penalty for femicide and affirmed the ability of abusers to seek parole. The international
community has viewed this decision as a miscarriage of justice, putting the life and dignity of
survivors at risk.331
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Finally, both laws fail to properly recognize the effects of the pre-existing systems of
power. When judges evaluate gender-based violence cases, they often utilize “adjacent laws” to
make their decisions.332 By using “adjacent laws,” reports are not sent to the Specialized Court
system. For instance, the justice system may investigate and prosecute a crime of femicide as
murder, which ignores the gendered implications and avoids the heightened scrutiny of the
Specialized Court. In the general criminal court, abusers can receive reduced sentences. Judges
in this system may also completely disregard interpersonal violence as a crime. Judges will
refuse to use the 2008 and 1996 Laws, claiming these Laws violate the principle of “equality
under the law,” because there are no “analogous” laws to protect men.333 Moreover, because the
laws are embedded in discriminatory practices, crimes against women persist with impunity. The
Guatemalan government’s response to the systemic culture of violence against women has failed.
Machismo
The laws dedicated to eradicating gender-based violence, as well as the provisions of the
Civil Code, must be understood within a particular social context. A country’s legal system does
not exist in isolation; rather, it is reflective of larger structures of power. Relics of colonial
thinking have infused modern ideology. In many Latin American countries, the result is the
phenomenon of machismo.
The Guatemalan National Institute of Forensic Science defines machismo as “an arrogant
attitude of men with respect to women, discrimination and undervaluation of women by
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considering them inferior to men.” 334 Machismo fosters “an exaggerated importance of
maleness” and leads to an expectation that men can use sexual or physical aggression to control
women.335 Social scientists consider machismo an important cultural variable in Latin America
which fosters the notion that women are submissive to men.336 This assumption normalizes
gender-based violence. Furthermore, machista culture facilitates the choice to uphold laws that
re-assert male superiority, which often conflict directly with the newer laws that provide
protection for women. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the
“prevalence of a machista culture…lead[s] to particular brutality against women in
Guatemala.”337
The acceptance and normalization of violence is particularly evident within intimate
partner relationships. Women are viewed as the “daughters” of their husbands, requiring women
to obey their husband’s desires.338 Infidelity, or suspected infidelity, transgresses this expectation
and allows men to “justify” acts of rape and sexual assault.339 However, men are “almost
culturally expected to be unfaithful.”340 This type of double standard places women at fault in
both situations. Either she is punished physically for her actions, or she is shamed for being
unable to satisfy her partner.341 Former Attorney General Paz y Paz affirms that this behavior is
particularly intentional. Often, forms of sexualized violence are used as mechanisms for
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retaliation when women attempt to “challenge their subordinate roles within traditionally
expected gender relationships.”342 Men use violence to punish women for departing from the
accepted, dominant structure. Acts of revenge within an intimate partner relationship reestablish
order and reaffirm the patriarchal relationship that inscribes male dominance.343
Machista culture activates when women attempt to denounce their abusive relationships
by seeking protection or obtaining a divorce. As Paz y Paz observes, a woman who leaves her
relationship emasculates a man and humiliates him “before his peers, his family, and himself.”
Therefore, others may seek to exert revenge against the woman.344 Because friends and family of
the abuser are also humiliated by this transgression of ascribed norms, a woman who leaves her
abuser fears retaliation by her husband and the wider community. Because of the normalization
of machista culture, women continue to live in fear and in danger.345
Fear of retaliation because of machismo places restrictions on women’s ability to report
or denounce violence. Prensa Libre, the leading Guatemalan newspaper, covered a 2016 protest
in Guatemala City. Women called on the government to recognize the epidemic of violence.
Prensa Libre published the response of the Public Ministry: “In Guatemala, there exists a culture
of discrimination and sexist stereotypes that permeates all of the institutions within the justice
sector.” 346 Stereotypes about women’s roles and actions reinforce impunity. Elisa Portillo
Nájera explains that machismo is deeply entrenched in the way law enforcement personnel and
judicial officials will respond to reports of violence. Officials refuse to protect women because
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they hold the same beliefs as the perpetrators. “Law enforcement and judicial officials often
blame women for their partners’ ‘misbehavior’.”347
Plaza Publica, a progressive Guatemalan newspaper, argues that machismo is a form of
psychological violence. Although the 2008 Law recognizes psychological violence as a crime,
machismo limits the ability to properly protect women. The effects of machismo taught
generations of women “that violence is part of what it means to be a woman, wife, or mother.”348
Elisa Portillo Nájera determined that the root cause of violence “stems from a culture that
embraces the subjugation of women and celebrates a man’s right to dominate.”349 Understanding
the impact of machismo on the levels of violence within Guatemalan society is essential to
evaluating broad levels of impunity.
This discussion of machismo is not meant to characterize all men as abusive, or Latin
America as uniquely violent. Rather, it is important to recognize how these cultural
understandings of power operate within society to perpetuate abuse. The connection between
machismo and colonialism is essential—within the structures of colonization, imbalances of
power became natural and enforcing this power through violence was the norm.

Part III: Impunity for Crimes of Gender-Based Violence
In the law, “impunity” means the ability to commit crimes or act unjustly without fear of
consequences. Just as the wartime genocide occurred unchecked, the perpetrators of modern
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gender-based violence believe they can “get away with murder in Guatemala.”350 The
Guatemalan Human Rights Commission reported that “prosecution and conviction for gender
and sexual crimes is almost nonexistent and almost absolute impunity for the perpetrator is the
norm.”351
The levels of impunity are striking. The UN Women’s Office reported that in Guatemala
the level of impunity for femicide remains at 98%.352 The Guatemalan Newspaper, El Periodico,
reported that only 3% of cases of gender-based violence receive recognition from the justice
system. The most recent report from the Integrated Justice System found that of 461,528 cases
reported, only 13,626 received a response from the justice system. 353 The Prosecutor’s Office
has an impunity rate of 97.5%; the Public Ministry has an impunity rate of 97%.354 Although the
violence against women laws were created to defend women and establish legal protections, this
failure to respond halts potential progress. Most offices within the judicial system report
staggeringly different statistics on the rates of violence and judicial response—which enables
further impunity. The 2008 Law attempted to remedy this issue by establishing the National
Institute of Statistics (INE) to gather and generate information regarding the trends of genderbased violence.355 The INE requests data from eleven different governmental organizations, and
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then reviews and analyzes the reports to publish a formal record. 356 The INE has discovered
great inconsistencies within the reports of each organization; some organizations even refuse to
cooperate in sharing their reports.357 The efforts of the INE—established to address the
miscarriage of justice—often publish “outdated” and “inconsistent” reports.358
Guatemala is unable to translate the rights that are codified in the rules of law into legal
action. In addition to the use of “adjacent laws,” impunity arises from the normalization of
violence that is rooted in a culture of gender discrimination. The socio-legal context of the
country was significant to writing and developing these laws. This significance remains true
within the application of the law. Menjívar and Walsh explains that “laws are likely to be
ineffective and futile because the socio-legal context that generally discriminates against women
is left unchanged even when laws meant to protect women are passed.”359 The laws specifically
address behavior, not the roots of inequality; therefore, in even the best cases, the judicial system
offers a minimal response.360 Social contexts enable the perspective that gender-based violence is
not extraordinary, therefore, basic procedures utilized in criminal investigations are often
dismissed.361 For example, police refrain from collecting or preserving evidence.362 This creates
a great challenge for survivors during litigation. Without proof, convincing the judge of the facts
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of the case is arduous. Furthermore, justice system officials often claim a lack of awareness or
maintain a willful ignorance about the legal protections available to women.363 In regard to the
2008 Law Against Femicide, many judges claim that “they do not understand its provisions and
that it is very complicated.”364 Masking their biases as confusion, judges disregard violence,
which renders the justice system dysfunctional.
When the justice system forgoes its responsibility, the burden of pursuing justice is
placed on the survivors of violence. However, this creates further impunity because many
women fear retaliation, or anticipate that the justice system will not respond to their needs.365
Instead, women choose silence.366 Cecilia Menjívar contends that fear alone does not drive this
silence. Silence is rooted in the “habit of keeping quiet in a world that coercively demands
women’s compliance, sacrifice, and enduring violence.”367 Finally, further impunity results from
the stereotype that women who survive abuse must somehow have provoked their abuser’s
actions.368 As former Attorney General Thelma Aldana reports, during court proceedings, judges
will tell survivors of domestic violence to “go back to your husband, attend to your husband, this
is why you were beaten.”369 This type of blame is widespread in the Guatemalan legal system.
Elisa Portillo Nájera, explains that a judge’s blame is rooted in a lack of recognition about the
severity of gender-based violence:
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In one instance, a judge at a training I held asked me if I would please inform the women
not to dress too provocatively and cause men to commit crimes. In other instances,
women have reported to me that policemen have suggested that problems can be fixed if
the woman complies with norms specified by society, such as preparing a man’s favorite
meal. Because the police, prosecutors, and judges believe that men have the right to use
violence against their partners to control them, they do not take cases of violence against
women seriously. Furthermore, these officials are often indifferent to or ignorant about
the cycle of domestic violence, whereby women are abused over and over or even killed
by their partners.370
This socio-legal context intensifies the problems of the ineffective legal measures. The result is a
high and often insurmountable level of impunity.

Conclusion
Guatemalan women seeking support must navigate a justice system that has failed to
address gender-based harm and has institutionalized violence as normal. Instead of recognizing
the gravity of gender-based violence, the justice system supports embedded social inequality.
Women in Guatemala face many forms of violence: non-visible forms of violence such as
structural, symbolic, political, and economic, as well as physical and sexual assault, rape, and
murder. The social understandings of women’s roles in society have limited real progress in both
creation and enactment of law. As Menjívar writes: “The law should be an arena where the less
powerful are put on equal footing with the more powerful, but in the context of Guatemala, it
often becomes an arena where women’s relative lack of power is reinforced and its effects
amplified when they seek help.”371
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The system of violence within Guatemala is a root cause for migration. Understanding
this system is imperative to recognizing the injustices that proliferate within the United States
asylum system. The next chapter provides an overview of the U.S. asylum system.
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CHAPTER IV: THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM
Throughout human history, people have migrated for economic opportunity, or to flee
natural disasters, violence, and persecution. Migration defines the movement of people within or
between countries. Migration is a global phenomenon affecting thousands of people every day.
The term immigrant refers to an individual who enters a new location with intentions to remain,
either temporarily or permanently. Most countries have created systems to recognize legal
structures of migration: tourist visas, legal permanent resident cards, sponsorship by a legal
family member, and other structures that identify a human being whose status is in transition.
The United States offers these options for immigrants who enter with express legal permission.
The term immigrant is often used as the catch-all phrase to refer to anyone outside of their
country, state, or city of origin. However, there is an important and specific distinction within the
category of immigrant; the subset of people defined as refugees and asylum seekers are entitled
to explicit protections universalized in international law and established through domestic policy.
By contrast, people who move voluntarily, presumably for economic opportunity, do not receive
protections under international law.372
Blurring the distinction between asylum seekers and other immigrants ignores the
specificity of their circumstances. This chapter will provide an overview of the international and
domestic policies that provide specific legal protections for seeking asylum. I focus first on
international regulations and U.S. policies. I then provide an analysis of unresolved problems
within asylum law. Finally, I highlight the specific legal parameters for gender-based asylum.
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This discussion of asylum jurisprudence is pertinent to understand the analysis of individual
asylum cases and their implications in Chapter V.

Asylum Law in the United States
The Origins and Classification of International Asylum Policy
The United Nations defined the right to asylum during the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Convention or 1951 Convention).373 The Convention provided a set
definition for a refugee: an individual with a “well-founded fear” of persecution due to their
“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion…”374
The global community focused on creating a policy that would establish protections for refugees
who were persecuted during WWII. The Refugee Convention only provided legal pathways to
asylum for people of European origin who became refugees due to the “events occurring before
January 1951.”375 Sixteen years later, the international community recognized the need for a
policy that would address future circumstances. In response, over 100 countries signed the
United Nations’ 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol or 1967 Protocol).376
The content of the Protocol replicated the 1951 Convention, but abandoned location and time-
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based restrictions.377 International Law provided an outline for creating domestic policies to
protect people who fell under the newly defined term: refugee.378

United States Domestic Policy
The United States did not come into compliance with the Protocol until 1980, thirteen
years later. In that year, President Jimmy Carter signed the Refugee Act as an addendum to the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the INA) and the Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. The
Refugee Act (the Act) employed the same definition of “refugee” as both the Convention and the
Protocol:
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion…379
Under the Act, individuals seeking refuge had two primary procedural options for securing
protection.380
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First, the Act established the U.S. Refugee and Admission Program (USRAP).381 Under
this program, the President—in collaboration with Congress—sets an “admissions ceiling” for
refugees in a calendar year. The President determines potential admittance by numbers, priority,
and country of origin.382 Refugees who are living abroad apply for admittance. The
specifications of USRAP allows the U.S. government to establish the “admissions ceiling”
through a discussion of the reasons “for believing that the proposed admission of refugees is
justified by humanitarian concerns or grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest...”383
Second, the Act established a procedure for refugees to apply for asylum “irrespective of
such alien’s status.”384 The individual might be in transit to the U.S, or have already arrived, but
must meet the definition of a refugee. First, the individual must prove “persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution.” Second the individual must be “unable or unwilling” to return to
their country of origin. Third, the individual must show a “nexus” between the persecution and
“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”385 The
other legal option for refugees at the border or within the U.S. is a “withholding of removal”386
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grant, secured only if an individual can prove that their “life or freedom would be threatened” if
returned to their country of origin.387

The Adjudicatory Levels of the Asylum Process
The first level of the asylum process is “non-adversarial.”388 Refugees meet with an
Asylum Officer (AO) at one of eight Asylum Offices throughout the country for an interview.
Individuals at the AO level seek “affirmative” asylum—they are already living within the U.S.
and voluntarily present themselves to USCIS. After the interview, an AO can either grant relief
(asylum status) or refer the case to an Immigration Judge for further review.
Cases heard at Immigration Courts are adversarial, mirroring a typical hearing. A
representative of the U.S. government, typically an attorney with U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), presents the government’s
side of the case; the applicant defends their asylum claim. Although an attorney may represent
an asylum seeker, representation is not provided automatically.389 An Immigration Judge decides
to grant or deny asylum. Either the applicant or the government can appeal the decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—under the Department of Justice. A decision may then be
appealed to a Federal Circuit Appeals Court, and an Appeals Court’s decision can be appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, the U.S. Attorney General is given a rarely used discretionary
privilege to remand cases to themselves if they find that the Immigration Judge, BIA, and/or a
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Federal Court made an unjust or improper decision. Those eventually denied asylum are subject
to deportation to their country of origin.

A Few Problems of Refugee and Asylum Law
While the 1980 Refugee Act placed the U.S. in compliance with international norms, the
law is overtly political in its application. Quotas for refugees are explicitly based on “national
interest,” which gives the President wide latitude to determine allowances based on
contemporary agendas of foreign policy. In times of conflict, this provision has allowed the
government to raise the ceiling for people coming from “enemy” territory for reasons of
propaganda. For instance, during the Cold War the highest refugee allotments went to people
fleeing the USSR and denouncing communism. By contrast, during decades of U.S. government
support to Latin American dictatorships, the government approved low numbers of refugees
from Latin America, disregarding grave human rights abuses.390 In practice, the Refugee Act can
place national interest above humanitarian concerns.391
Scholar Karen Musalo writes that the asylum and withholding pathways for legal
admission to the U.S were “intended” to be free of politics and foreign policy.392 Still, the
process is arduous. First, asylum applicants bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that they
meet the conditions for asylum. To meet the definition of a “refugee,” they must prove one of the
five enumerated grounds, a well-founded fear, and a nexus between the two. Often, an Asylum
Officer, the Immigration Judge, and/or the BIA will require applicants to provide physical proof
of persecution. For example, if an asylum seeker filed a police report after surviving domestic
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violence, the asylum seekers must provide a physical copy of the report. Many applicants are
unaware of this obligation. Meeting the burden of proof also requires establishing that the
applicant’s country of origin is unable or unwilling to provide protection. Providing
documentation of country conditions or expert declarations to meet this burden is almost
impossible for asylum seekers without legal representation. Asylum seekers must provide
sufficient evidence to be considered credible, but without physical documentation, the
immigration official may determine credibility subjectively, based on testimony.
The second core problem results from the determination of credibility. Asylum decisions
are “discretionary,” meaning that the immigration official has the power to choose relief or
deportation. Although the legal structure of asylum only requires an applicant show a 10%
probability of future persecution, the results of discretionary decision-making reveal great
disparity.393 In their book Refugee Roulette Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication
and Proposals for Reform, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz and Phillip Schrag discuss
the “great deal of statistical variation in the outcomes pronounced by decision makers.”394 Their
text demonstrates the biases in the decisions and the significant variation in decisions between
offices, regions, courthouses, year, and even gender. Decisions may even reflect the prior career
of the adjudicator.395
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Like problems within the USRAP policy, asylum grants also demonstrate favoritism.
During the Civil War, Guatemalans were denied asylum at a rate of 99 percent, while immigrants
from Soviet-controlled territories fared much better.396 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag
quote former Attorney General Robert Jackson who argues, “It is obviously repugnant to one’s
sense of justice” that asylum decisions depend in large part on “purely fortuitous circumstance;
namely the personality of the particular judge […].”397 Although the Refugee Act established
pathways for asylum, the application of the Act restricts access to legal protections.

Gender-Based Asylum
In 2018, The UNHCR reported that of the 258 million migrants around the world, about
10% are refugees. Of this 25.9 million, half are women or children.398 The Convention, Protocol,
and 1980 Refugee Act do not address specifically the status of women or children. In all three
legal documents, the definition of a refugee is gender neutral.399 Gender is not provided as one of
the five enumerated grounds under U.S. asylum law. This creates a paradox for a woman seeking
asylum: requiring her to shape her experience to fit within a different category, commonly the
“particular social group” ground.
The BIA first defined “particular social group” in the seminal 1985 case, Matter of
Acosta.400 A Salvadoran taxi driver, who had created a cooperative taxi association, requested
asylum due to fear of persecution by a guerilla group. He claimed his fear of persecution was on
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the account of his membership in the group comprised of “COTAXI drivers and persons engaged
in the transportation industry.”401 The Acosta decision used the theories developed in ejusdem
generis (“of the same kind”), to propose that the particular social group402 definition should be
applied in the same manner as the other considerations for asylum: race, religion, nationality, and
political opinion.403 In evaluating the other four grounds, the BIA concluded that each contained
an “immutable characteristic” or a fundamental part of a person’s identity that they should not be
required to change.404 In Acosta, the BIA extended the understanding of “immutable” to
particular social groups, specifying that “the shared characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or … it might be a shared past experience.”405 In 2006, the BIA also
began to require a showing of “social visibility,” asserting that the proposed particular social
group must be “recognizable and distinct in society.”406 The Acosta standard became precedent
for proposing social groups defined by “sex.”407
Eleven years later, the BIA issued another landmark decision: Matter of Kasinga.408 The
BIA granted asylum to a woman who fled Togo as a teenager to escape female genital cutting.
The BIA accepted Ms. Kassindja’s attorney’s argument that her particular social group was
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comprised of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM [female
genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”409 The decision set
the precedent that women fleeing gender-based persecution could be eligible for asylum.
Despite the Kassindja victory, asylum officers and immigration judges remained
skeptical when ruling on gender-based asylum claims.410 In the interim between the Matter of
Kasinga and the next major victory in 2014, many judges rejected domestic violence cases
outright, reasoning that domestic violence is “personal” and not a matter of public concern. On
August 26, 2014, the BIA issued the precedential decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, recognizing
domestic violence as a basis for asylum.411 In this case, the BIA found that Ms. Aminita
Cifuentes was a member of the particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship.”412 The Matter of A-R-C-G- decision affirmed the immutability
of gender and asserted that marital status can be immutable depending on extenuating
circumstances.413 This decision established that domestic violence could provide the basis for an
asylum claim, but the legal holding in A-R-C-G- is narrow and leaves much discretion to
immigration judges.414 The cases of Acosta, Kassindja, and A-R-C-G- form the basis for most
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gender-based asylum cases. Yet, as Karen Musalo summarizes, “few refugee issues have been as
controversial as that of gender asylum.”415

Conclusion
The jurisprudence of asylum and refugee law shapes the discussion of gender-based
asylum cases in the next chapter. Discretionary privilege, bias, and implications of foreign policy
are evident in the way adjudicators interpret gender-based claims. The fact that gender is not an
enumerated, statutory ground, as well as the precedents set in decisions like Kasinga and
A-R-C-G-, create requirements for women to shape their experiences to fit into a limited
understanding of persecution. Within this limitation, interpersonal violence committed against
women is often labeled as private and undeserving of state intervention. Discounting the
experience of women who are victims of gender-based violence reveals inherent bias about the
risk of harm sustained by these women, and their limited options for self-protection. To meet the
burden of proof, asylum seekers endeavor to prove that gender-based violence is pervasive in
their country of origin—allowing the U.S. to position itself as separate from and without
culpability for the culture of violence in Latin America. These complex issues correlate directly
to the way the U.S. views the third-world woman as inferior—a remnant of colonial ideology—
and views itself as a benevolent grantor of paternalistic protection.
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CHAPTER V: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYLUM DECISIONS
Throughout the 20th century, the United States acted with paternalism and superiority to
control the Guatemalan political and economic systems. The United States played a significant
role in the destabilization of Guatemala. At each stage of involvement, the U.S. increased and
exaggerated its methods to exercise control—through economic monopolies, political mischief,
and finally engagement with violence. As Chapter III highlighted, the Civil War, decades of
violence, and the government’s inability to provide adequate protection, has led many
Guatemalan women to seek asylum in the United States.
The U.S. asylum system mirrors past actions of paternalism. The U.S., through the direct
actions of immigration officials, continues to act in a controlling manner, either by granting
asylum to women who fit within the specific parameters of “worthiness” or deporting women
who do not meet these expectations. This chapter will evaluate a selection of asylum cases to
explore the perceptions of gender within the immigration system and, specifically, how
immigration officials apply paternal superiority. The asylum system for Guatemalan women
must be evaluated with a clear understanding of the shared histories of the U.S. and Guatemala.
The U.S. asylum system contains essential flaws that work to frame a woman’s experience in a
particular manner. Often, women are framed as “unable” (unable to leave) in order to meet the
parameters of an enumerated ground and must prove they experienced persecution to meet varied
criteria across the U.S. Circuit Courts. Guatemalans must meet perceived standards of credibility,
and argue that the gender-based violence was egregious, in a country where, paradoxically,
gender-based violence is viewed as the norm.
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I selected a set of twenty-four gender-based asylum cases.416 I narrowed my analysis to this
set of twenty-four cases because each case provides enough specific detail to interrogate the
trajectory of the claim. All cases within my study were opened following the conclusion of the
Civil War and the signing of the Peace Accords. Though each case represents a unique
experience of suffering, strength, and survival, the twenty-four documents contain similarities.
Given the specific goals of my project, each case centers the experience of a woman who is a
survivor of gender-based violence.417 The spectrum of violence includes rape, attempted rape,
intimate partner violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment, reproductive control, violent threats,
economic restrictions, physical beating, use of weapons, attempted murder, and gang violence—
including rape, forced relationships, and coercion. All of these actions can be understood within
the larger sector of actions committed to exhibit control.
In the majority of cases, the woman survived multiple violent acts. In three of the cases,
women received beatings because they were pregnant. Actions sometimes targeted women’s
reproductive capacity—including violent demands for sexual intercourse with the purpose of
reproduction, and physical harm to reproductive organs. A majority of the cases refer either to
violence during the Civil War, or recent violence that resembles actions that took place during
the Civil War massacres: “he stated that he would kill her children in front of her, then torture
her, rape her, and cut her into pieces.”418 Of the twenty-four asylum seekers, the majority are
indigenous; therefore, they do not speak Spanish as their primary language. Moreover, most
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women report that the National Civil Police (PNC) did not offer protection, seriously address
their complaints, or prosecute their abusers. Many women choose not to report the violence to
the police because their abusers threatened retribution. A few women reported fear of the police
due to collusion or direct involvement of their family members in law enforcement. Finally, all
cases identify connections to societal understandings of the woman’s role: “Because we are
women, we’re not worth anything. People see us just as the property of the men we are
with…your job as a woman is to serve your man.”419
I have obtained these decisions from the online legal service LexisNexis, or from the Center
for Gender and Refugee Studies database. Many of the decisions redact names, locations, ages,
and other personal details to maintain anonymity. Therefore, I have chosen to analyze the cases
by theme, concept, and argument—switching between specific cases frequently. When possible,
I have utilized other details to distinguish among cases. Although my analysis centers on the
twenty-four asylum cases, not all cases are cited directly. I used some cases primarily to shape
my analysis, but do not provide examples from the decision documents. I have chosen to name
the women within the redacted cases with a distinct color—i.e. Ms. Blue—rather than numbers
or letters, which felt dehumanizing. This choice is not meant to apply alternative meaning to
individual cases; rather this effort intends to maintain privacy. With this limitation in mind, I
emphasize three focal cases, the cases of Rody Alvarado, Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez, and
Aminita Cifuentes (ARCG). Because the courts published these decisions, the asylum seeker’s
names and details about their experiences within the immigration system are public record. I will
begin this chapter with an outline of these three cases.
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Rody Alvarado (First decision: 1996, Final outcome: 2009)
Rody Alvarado420 married Francisco Osorio in 1986 at the age of sixteen. After suffering
years of interpersonal violence at the hands of Mr. Osorio, Ms. Alvarado fled to the United
States, seeking asylum status.421 In 1996, an Immigration Judge granted Ms. Alvarado asylum
based on a defined social group of “women who have been involved intimately with their male
companions, who believe in male domination,” and an imputed political opinion—the
enumerated ground—that Ms. Alvarado believed she should live free of violence. However, in
1999, Ms. Alvarado’s asylum status was reversed by the BIA.422 The Board ruled that she had
not proven membership in a particular social group, nor had she proven that Mr. Osorio abused
her on account of her group or an imputed political opinion. The Board did not believe her
claims satisfied the nexus requirement, a connection between the abuse suffered and an
enumerated ground. In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security submitted a brief to Attorney
General John Ashcroft who had recertified the case to himself.423 This brief challenged the
Board’s ruling and offered support for the original asylum grant. Notably, DHS agreed that the
original particular social group did not qualify, and instead identified a new social group:
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.” After further
procedural irregularities, Attorney General Michael Mukasey ordered the BIA (in 2008) to make
a final decision. The BIA sent the case back to an Immigration Judge. A San Francisco
Immigration Judge granted asylum to Rody Alvarado in 2009 after she reconceptualized her
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story to fit within the parameters outlined by the Department of Homeland Security. This
concluded a 14-year battle with United States immigration forces.

Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez (First decision: 2001, Final outcome: 2004)
Just two years after Ms. Alvarado’s initial asylum grant, Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez
received a Notice to Appear (NTA)424 from Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS).425
Ms. Garcia Martinez grew up in the rural village of San Andres Villa Seca in Southern
Guatemala, a central location of violence during the Civil War. Around 1985, a coalition of
guerilla soldiers arrived in her village to conscript the local men; they kidnapped Ms. Garcia
Martinez’s brother.426 A few years later, the Guatemalan military arrived in her hometown and
repeatedly attacked, raped, and killed the villagers under the assumption that the entire
community supported the guerilla insurgency. One night, at 9pm, soldiers entered her family’s
home, beat her parents, and gang-raped nineteen-year-old Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez.427 The
soldiers threatened to return if the family revealed what had happened. Ms. Garcia Martinez fled
to the United States in search of safety. The Immigration Judge who heard her case in 2001
stated that Ms. Garcia-Martinez had “testified sincerely and genuinely without hesitation.”428
However, while he affirmed her narrative’s authenticity, the judge did not believe that these
violent acts were connected to her political opinion, or her membership in a particular social
group. The Immigration Judge denied her claim, ruling that the horrific event was “only a
criminal act that was committed against her by a soldier,” so it did not establish a well-founded
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fear of persecution.429 Following this decision, Ms. Garcia-Martinez appealed the ruling to the
BIA. In 2004, the BIA granted her asylum, based on conclusions about the pervasiveness of
violence within Guatemala following the conclusion of the Civil War.

Aminita Cifuentes (First Decision: 2009, Final outcome: 2014)
For over a decade, Ms. Aminita Cifuentes’s (ARCG) husband raped, beat, and tormented
her. She lost her hearing, gave birth prematurely, and had difficulty breathing and speaking due
to his acts of physical violence.430 Ms. Cifuentes sought protection from the Guatemalan police
and court system. The authorities did not offer support and told her to return to her husband. In
fear for her life, Ms. Cifuentes escaped to the U.S. The IJ who heard her case first found Ms.
Cifuentes credible, and the abuse “unconscionable,” but the harm suffered was “not
persecution.”431 Because the abuse took place “without reason,” the IJ determined that Ms.
Cifuentes had not proven nexus to her proposed PSG or a political opinion.432 In 2014, the BIA,
on appeal, granted Ms. Cifuentes asylum with the PSG of “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship.” Following the same line of reasoning as Rody Alvarado,
the decision in the Matter of A-R-C-G- established the legal precedent of this particular social
group.433
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Asylum Law Constructs and Challenges
The precedent set in the Matter of A-R-C-G- marked a critical advancement in gender-based
asylum. However, the case did not address fundamental questions: What constitutes a sufficient
“inability” to meet the standards of the precedential particular social group established in the
Matter of A-R-C-G-? How will women demonstrate their “inability”? What enumerated grounds
remain for women who are deemed “able”? How can a woman prove the motivations of others
behind acts of brutal violence? Will all interpersonal violence be considered persecutory? How
will perceived “credibility” shape an outcome? How much attention should judges pay to the
conditions in the country of origin?
These questions frame my analysis of the twenty-four asylum decisions. This chapter
analyzes how the asylum system operates in a paternalistic manner through general patterns of
control. I emphasize the intrinsic challenges of the structure, and then apply the ways in which
the system’s paternalistic operations are especially problematic when addressing the asylum
claims of Guatemalan women. An important distinction within the application of bias in cases of
Guatemalan women arises from judges’ perceptions of women from the Third World. Judges and
asylum officers typically place Guatemalan women in one of two camps: unworthy applicants
who abuse the asylum system, or desperate and weak women who are begging for safety from
the tyranny of their own culture.434
I will discuss the challenges posed by the reality that gender is not an enumerated ground—a
barrier in asylum law that has forced women to use other methods. Within this discussion, I
address the rhetorical issues of deriving asylum claims from a term of subordination: “unable.”

434

Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002), 119.

109
Next, I focus on the issue of proving persecution, and the challenges of a successful nexus claim
(i.e. an abuser’s motivation). I will also focus on the problems inherent in the subjective
determination of credibility. Finally, I discuss how the asylum system erroneously views genderbased violence as pervasive only within the developing world.

Part I: How General Structural Problems Impact Gender-Based Asylum
I begin my analysis by highlighting the general structural pitfalls within the asylum
system as applied to gender-based claims. My research centers on the specific cases of
Guatemalan women: however, women of other nationalities experience similar challenges. This
first section makes note of the impact of structural issues within the asylum system. Women
experience challenges through the process of outlining membership in one of the enumerated
grounds and connecting this ground to a viable claim for the experience of persecution. This
limited understanding of persecution often dismisses forms of violence that women experience
within the “private” sphere, revealing bias about women’s right to safety. This bias becomes
operationalized when immigration judges utilize their discretionary privilege to evaluate the
credibility of women’s claims. The structural problems that impact gender-based asylum cases
have profound resonance in Guatemalan women’s asylum claims.

The Enumerated Ground: The Use of the Term “Unable”
The first problem that women asylum seekers face is the reality that gender is not an
enumerated ground. In order to meet the legal requirements, asylum seekers must prove that their
persecution is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group (PSG). PSG is composed of members who share a common immutable
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characteristic that is socially distinct and visible within their society. The precedent established
in A-R-C-G- enables women—Guatemalan women especially—greater ability to position their
claim. However, the precedent set by this case developed from a limited legal holding based on
the defined PSG “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” This
decision often requires women to reconceptualize their experience to meet the legal precedent of
the PSG defined by “unable to leave.”.
The word “unable” is itself problematic. Unable, as an antonym to able (capable,
qualified etc.), it places the lack of capacity on the shoulders of the woman. The lack of ability is
hers. Asylum cases aside, in many instances of intimate partner violence, the survivor hears these
questions: “Why didn’t you leave?” or “Why didn’t you tell someone?” These questions blame
the victim, and, to a certain degree, take responsibility away from the abuser. The implication: if
the victim had found the strength to ask for help, she might have stopped the abuse. Essentially,
interrogating the victim lets the abuser off the hook.
Structuring a case based within the terminology of “unable” raises the issue of victimblaming. In 1971, Dr. William Ryan coined the phrase “victim-blaming” to describe white
people who attempt to justify racial “inequality by finding defects in the victims of
inequality.”435 The disturbing idea of blaming the victim for their inability to act underscores
cases of interpersonal violence. Individuals may cite specific incidents that allow them “to hold
the victim as least partially responsible for the incident.”436 The precedent set in A-R-C-G- that
focused on a woman's “inability” to leave positions the asylum seeker as having some
responsibility for her situation.
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Determining whether a woman is actually “unable to leave” has confounded adjudicators
and led to incongruent outcomes. The Matter of A-R-C-G- set precedent that “inability” should
be determined by the facts of the asylee’s experience and country conditions evidence. However,
no specific methods for evaluating “inability” were outlined in A-R-C-G-. There are no
guidelines about whether “inability” is determined by the physical actions of the asylum seeker,
or, rather, the change in patterns of violence committed by the abuser. A-R-C-G- did not include
a specific analysis of the available legal structure’s efficacy or sufficiency. 437 Some judges focus
primarily on whether an asylum seeker obtained legal separation or physically moved away from
their abuser. If the judge finds either form of separation, the review into the asylum seeker’s
“ability” may conclude. Judges may ignore continued verbal or physical threats, or disregard acts
of violence in making this conclusion. This cruel catch-22 requires gender-based asylum seekers
to carefully craft their personal testimonies to fit a particular model and convince adjudicators of
their need for protection. This produces two-dimensional narratives that transition women’s lives
and experiences into static stories.438 The limitations of the structure of enumerated grounds
create further challenges for women to prove persecution.

Proving Persecution
In order to gain asylum, applicants must also prove “persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution” as well as a “nexus” between the violence and an enumerated ground.
Unfortunately, asylum laws do not clearly define “persecution,”439 and neither has the Supreme
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Court, which leaves each of the twelve U.S. Federal Court Districts free to craft its own
definition and follow its own district precedents. Some definitions include “suffering” or “harm”
against “those who differ” in an “offensive way”; and an “extreme concept” that does not
encompass all offensive actions and terms in society.440 Because the definition of “persecution”
remains malleable, an individual judge’s perspective may inform the decision in an asylum case.
For example, in many of the court opinions discussed below, judges denied asylum to
Guatemalan women because, in their view, gendered violence, including sexual violence, was
not considered a grave enough harm. Gender-based violence is framed as a “private” matter
rather than an instance of “persecution.” When asylum seekers attempt to prove a nexus between
the harm and their defined enumerated ground, judges require women to provide specific
explanations for why the abuse occurred—with a level of scrutiny that often becomes
unreasonable and inhumane. Nancy Kelly argues that this lack of acknowledgement of genderbased harms has roots in the collective worldview of rape. In her view, many people are
challenged to “accept rape and other forms of sexual abuse as violence, and [have a] tendency to
ascribe personal motivations to persecutors when the harm is sexual.”441 Some immigration
judges determine that sexualized violence occurred because of an individual actor’s personal
desire to inflict harm; therefore, the asylum seeker does not require state protection—an example
of the conflation of the public and the private sphere.
The Convention, Protocol, and Refugee Act all utilize the same “gender neutral”
definition of a refugee. Semantics do not inform reality for women refugees. Sociologist Ethne
Luibheid explains that the developed world’s paradigm of a refugee is male. She writes, “Realms
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of experience that usually belonged to women—including experiences of rape—were foreclosed
from consideration as ‘political’ and as possible grounds for asylum.”442 Gender-based violence,
and specifically sexual violence, is viewed as a “private matter even when committed by a
government official or in a political context.”443 Ulla Wischermann explains the relationship
between the public and private sphere in her piece “Feminist Theories and the Separation of the
Private and the Public: Looking Back, Looking Forward.” Wischermann writes that feminist
theory has offered extensive critiques on the political concept that “holds on to a separation of
the two spheres.”444 In Wischermann’s view, these spheres are given specific gendered
connotations: public, which is read as “male,” and private, which is read as “female.”445
Wischermann asserts that by creating this separation, the political world also creates a hierarchy
that positions “women’s lives and work” as invisible.446 The private sphere, coded as the
“women’s realm,” is rendered apolitical.
Karen Musalo contends that the creation of these “spheres” has roots in the beginning of
the international human rights movement. The human rights agenda viewed violations of
women’s rights as derived from cultural or religious norms. Violent acts committed against
women were ignored and downgraded to the “private sphere.” Second-wave feminists, and
specifically women’s rights activists, criticized the lack of attention paid toward gendered
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violence.447 The human rights arena and the work of second wave feminism amplified the
perspective that violations of women’s rights that occur in “private” spaces must be understood
as political and a matter of public concern.448 Actions against people living in oppressed or
marginalized communities should be labeled—publicly and politically—as injustices. The
dichotomous relationship between the private and public spheres continues to surface in genderbased asylum cases. As compared to other types of persecution, the asylum system often views
instances of rape and interpersonal violence as “private” and therefore “categorically different”
than persecution that occurs in the “public” sphere.449 Grave injustices may occur when asylum
officers, immigration judges, and others relegate violent actions to the private sphere, effectively
dismissing the gender violence as apolitical and falling short of “persecution.”

Nexus and Credibility: The Problems of Bias
After women successfully prove that the harm they suffered rose to the level of
persecution, they must meet an additional criterion: asylum status requires a connection, a nexus,
between one of the five enumerated grounds and past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution. This final provision requires women to provide an explanation for the abuse
they suffered. The Matter of A-R-C-G- made it possible for more women to make asylum claims
based on domestic violence; but, the A-R-C-G- decision did not articulate how women establish
the motivation of their abuser, the nexus between domestic violence and persecution.450 Without
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a clear guideline, women seeking asylum must determine what evidence to utilize in order to
prove the motive behind their abusers’ actions. This problem is confounded by the issue of
adjudicators’ “discretionary” privilege: the subjective power Department of Justice
representatives hold to evaluate a case. This authority allows immigration officials to assess
individual claims and evaluate asylum seekers. This “privilege” centralizes the perspective of the
immigration official, often at the cost of the woman seeking asylum.
Discretionary privilege creates a related problem. Immigration officials are required to
make a “credibility” determination of the asylum seeker.451 In her article “Citizenship and the
Performance of Credibility: Audiencing Gender-based Asylum Seekers in U.S. Immigration
Courts,” Sara L. McKinnon explores how “audiences” evaluate and determine credibility in
cases of gender-based persecution.452 She defines an audience as “those that are the gatekeepers
to US Citizenship, those who read the potential citizen and determine if they deserve access.”453
In McKinnon’s analysis, judges evaluating gender-based asylum cases focus more on the
interpretation of credibility and pay less attention to the specifics of an applicant’s asylum claim.
The establishment of “credibility” accentuates the issue of “audiencing.” The audience at
a play or movie has an expectation of the action they will see and hear. Many audience members
enter the performance space with preconceived ideas of what they will feel. Similar expectations
are present when immigration officials “audience” asylum claims. Judges, and other gatekeepers,
anticipate the vocal and corporeal response of the asylum seeker during a “performance.” Judges
may find incongruities between their expectations of an appropriate testimonial “performance”
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and “what the woman claimant actually performs in court.”454 These conventions rely heavily on
“racist, sexist, classist, and nationalist discourses that favor certain subjects.”455 The assumptions
applied to immigrant women are not impartial. The expectations do not consider cultural norms
or the emotional challenge of speaking about intense trauma: ‘‘For Westerners, it is hard to
imagine why so few traumatized persons cry when describing the trauma. Many applicants have
described experiences of the utmost horror without any obvious emotional expression at all.’’456
Preconceived ideas about how a woman will perform create challenges for asylum
seekers who would naturally appear submissive and speak with hesitation or ambiguity. Vague
answers, a complete failure to respond to direct questions, or a diminished vocal presentation all
reflect an asylum seeker’s state of trauma.457 Asylum attorney Blaine Bookey extends this
argument. She explains that in gender-based asylum claims—specifically in cases of marital
violence—judges may apply their own opinions about a woman’s performance in court, and
extend their perspective to draw conclusions about the parameters of a marital relationship.458
Using their privilege as the prime “audience”, the judges may ignore the law.459 Rather than
make an adverse credibility determination based on inconsistent evidence, or critique disparities
between testimony and country conditions documentation, judges use their power as the
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“audience” to discredit the asylum seeker on the basis of personal conclusions.460 The
immigration system often characterizes gender-based harm as a less severe form of violence. The
impact of the adverse credibility ruling is extremely paternalistic. The violence is insufficient,
and women are “typecast” as liars and deceivers.
The structural problems within gender-based asylum cases may result in unjust outcomes.
The following sections apply the problems to the case documents of Guatemalan women to
showcase how these subjective viewpoints become operationalized. By examining the ways in
which the structures develop in each case, the level of bias, prejudice, and paternalism become
evident.

Part II: The Exaggeration of Paternalism in Guatemalan Women’s Asylum Cases
In this section, I apply each structural problem to the cases of Guatemalan women,
discussing the requirements to identify an enumerated ground, prove persecution, and establish
nexus. I conclude with a discussion of how the paternalistic relationship between Guatemala and
the United States exacerbates the structural problems and serves to minimize U.S. culpability for
the gender-based violence.

Creating a PSG: Guatemalan Women Reposition their Claims
The issue of the enumerated ground is illustrated through Rody Alvarado’s quest for
safety. Because Rody Alvarado could not rely on gender to construct her enumerated grounds for
asylum, she had to reconceptualize her story. In the original hearing, the IJ found that Ms.
Alvarado met the burden of proof for asylum based on two enumerated grounds. First, the IJ
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determined the viability of the PSG: “Guatemalan women who have been involved with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination.”461
Second, the IJ inferred Ms. Alvarado held a political opinion that women deserve a life free of
violence.462 The linguistic structure of the PSG casts Ms. Alvarado’s abuser, Osorio, as the
primary “actor”—he believed that women belong under male domination, and therefore Rody
Alvarado deserved protection. Osorio’s beliefs and harmful actions characterized the PSG. The
defined political opinion presented Ms. Alvarado as a woman with agency and strength. In this
determination, Ms. Alvarado deserved asylum because her husband believed he had the right to
abuse her in order to maintain control.
The BIA disagreed with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion. First the BIA determined
that there was no recognizable political opinion. The BIA found that Osorio “harmed the
respondent regardless of what she actually believed or what he thought she believed.”463 Because
Ms. Alvarado did not present specific testimony to indicate Osorio stated a reason for the abuse,
the BIA determined that the violence could not be attributed to any held belief. Instead the Board
focused on Ms. Alvarado’s statements that: “He hit me for no reason at all,” and that he “would
hit or kick me whenever he felt like it.”464 The Board ruled that unless “one assumes that the
common human desire not to be harmed or abused is in itself a ‘political opinion’,” Ms.
Alvarado did not present sufficient evidence to determine the motivation behind his violence.465
This thought process extended to the PSG. Because Ms. Alvarado did not prove a reason for the
abuse, the Board determined that the social group was adopted “exclusively for the purposes of
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this asylum case.” The BIA ignored established PSG precedent, disregarding the fact that gender
had been considered both “immutable” and “distinguishable.”
Despite the restrictive lens employed by the BIA initially, Ms. Alvarado did gain asylum
status after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intervened. The DHS crafted a new
PSG: Guatemalan women who are “unable to leave” her marriage. In this formulation, Ms.
Alvarado was the primary “actor”; but she lacked agency. In 2014, the Matter of A-R-C-G- made
this definition precedential law. The “unable to leave” PSG limits the protection and acceptance
of female victims of violence who seek asylum, and diminishes their autonomy.466
Following the line of reasoning in the cases of Rody Alvarado and Aminita Cifuentes
(ARCG), the attorney in Ms. Blue’s case followed the description of the violence suffered with a
powerful statement of agency: “she defied her common law husband, stood up for her human
rights as a woman by freeing herself of the abuse (emphasis added).”467 The word “defy” and
“stood up” imply capability—placing the applicant in challenging territory. This brief articulated
sixteen different PSGs, all of which used combinations of the immutable characteristics
“Guatemalan” and “women,” and one of several qualifiers which articulated both agency and a
lack thereof: “unable to leave”, “viewed as property”, “lacking control over their bodies” and
“women who invoke their human rights.” Responding to the complications that arose after the
Matter of A-B-, Ms. Blue’s attorney submitted a second brief. The two briefs contain great
similarities—but with a salient difference. The attorney did not include statements articulating
Ms. Blue’s agency, but instead offered thirty additional PSGs that focus on Ms. Blue’s inability
and her indigenous status. In the final decision, the IJ granted asylum, but focused only on the
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PSGs describing inability.468 Distorted by legal precedent, Ms. Blue’s case necessarily structured
her experience within the confines of “unable.” Would the case outcome have been different if
the statement of agency remained within the legal argument? Like Ms. Alvarado, Ms. Blue had
to position herself as a powerless woman in order to receive protection.
In another case, the attorney representing Ms. Red proposed eighteen different particular
social groups to defend her case for asylum.469 Only two of the proposed social groups contained
the word “unable.” However, the judge focused on these two groups, and ascribed her inability
to her vacillations about leaving her husband. In her testimony, she described a day she tried to
leave her husband. He got in front of their car to physically prevent her from leaving.470 He
begged her to forgive him, and “she stayed because she loved her husband.” The judge evaluated
this experience as a signal of inability and weakness, not as an act of further violence.
As demonstrated by Ms. Alvarado, Ms. Blue, and Ms. Red, Guatemalan women seeking
asylum after enduring interpersonal violence are further victimized by the essential placement of
their stories.471 The specific category “unable to leave” generates the conception “that women are
deserving of status [only] when they are perceived of as weak, passive victims.”472 By focusing
on perspectives that further victimize the asylum petitioner, the United States government
“rewards” asylum to Guatemalan women who present as weak. When Guatemalans do not fit the
expected “profile”, they risk exclusion.
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In the case of Ms. Indigo, the IJ found the respondent “credible and determined that her
sexual abuse and experience rose to the level of persecution.”473 Despite this determination, the
IJ ruled that Ms. Indigo did not provide sufficient proof regarding her protected ground. In
another case, Ms. Green, a minor, suffered from abuse perpetrated by her family.474 Her defined
PSG focused on her economic reliance on her abusers because of her age. The judge ruled that
this PSG was not “cognizable”; it lacked social distinction, and was “overbroad.” The abuse was
considered commonplace and insufficient to merit state protection. Essentially, both Ms. Green
and Ms. Indigo failed to meet the accepted profile for Guatemalan women seeking asylum,
because they did not open the lock with the word “unable.”
When the defined particular social group includes the phrase “unable to leave,”
investigators may ask the abuse survivor, “Why were you unable to leave?”475 Rody Alvarado
positioned her inability to leave on Osorio, her abuser. She explained that whenever she tried to
protest, Osorio responded: “You’re my woman, you do what I say.”476 The consequence was
explicit; Osorio threatened murder if she were to try to leave. Although Osorio’s behavior
included extreme threats, Alvarado’s inaction to protect herself—the use of the word “unable”—
suggests potential flaws in her character. In another case, Ms. Brown positioned her inability on
failure by the judicial system to protect her.477 Ms. Brown was a victim of cruelty during the Rio
Negro massacre during the Civil War. As an adult, her husband abused her verbally and
physically. Ms. Brown wanted to report the abuse but feared repercussions. Her husband’s
brother served in the police force. The judge determined that Ms. Brown did not prove an
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inability to leave because there was no “legal impediment” to obtaining a divorce—she did not
provide evidence that her husband prevented her from leaving. In this instance, Ms. Brown was
“blamed” for her inaction. The judge perceived her failure to secure protection not as a fault of
the legal system, but as her fault. The rhetoric of victim-blaming that emerges from the phrase
“unable to leave” places responsibility for self-protection onto the woman—a responsibility that
she fails to uphold. Both cases conflated a personal history of violence and subsequent search for
safety with the victim’s character flaws.

Proving Sufficient Inability
In some cases, Guatemalan women seeking asylum must also prove sufficient inability.
Both Ms. Coral and Ms. Yellow fled their homes to escape their abusive husbands.478 Ms. Coral
left her husband to live with her sister. Her husband continued to make verbal threats; he said he
would come find her and attack her. However, since her sister’s home was thirty minutes from
his village, the physical abuse stopped.479 In Ms. Yellow’s case, the IJ determined that the
“respondent’s act of separating” demonstrated her ability to leave.480 Despite the change of
residence, Ms. Yellow’s husband continued to “rape and beat her,” but he never “physically
forced her return.”481 The IJ determined that the impetus for these continued attacks was that she
“did leave the relationship, not that she was unable to” (emphasis added).482 Despite the
continued violence, both IJs determined that the women‘s affirmative act of separation indicated
ability.
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Both Ms. Coral and Ms. Yellow reported the abuse. The judge ruled that Ms. Coral was
“able to leave” the situation because of her report.483 However, the judge noted that “the
effectiveness of the police and judicial systems response is an open question.”484 In essence, the
judge overlooked the inadequacy of the institutional response and instead punished small acts of
agency as demonstrations of sufficient ability. In response to the IJ determination, Ms. Coral
emphasized that she could not obtain a divorce. She did not have the money to pay for the cost of
divorce, nor would her husband commit to payment. The judge responded that this was not
“sufficient inability” because it was based on “economic constraints” not “societal
expectations.”485 Similarly, the IJ in Ms. Yellow’s case determined that she showed her ability to
leave the relationship because she obtained a protective order against her husband. To the IJ, this
signified a lack of societal expectations or cultural constraints to constitute inability.486
Both women were denied asylum, because they demonstrated small acts of agency. The
subjective, “unable to leave” PSG is legally problematic, and has strong resonance with the
paternalistic relationship between Guatemala and the United States. Parallel to the United States’
intervention in Guatemala before and during the Civil War, the contemporary court system is
judging in a microcosm how Guatemalan women live their lives. Though women of other
nationalities have followed this legal precedent to use the “unable” terminology, this phrasing
originated within the cases of Ms. Alvarado and Ms. Cifuentes—two Guatemalan women.
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Defining Persecution
Because gender-based violence—sexualized violence in particular—may not rise to the
legal standard of persecution, Guatemalan women relive horrendous trauma to no avail. The
cases of Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez, Ms. Purple, Ms. Yellow, and Ms. Orange illuminate this
issue. As discussed previously, the judge in Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez’s case concluded that
the gang rape she endured was “a criminal act that was committed against her by a soldier.”487
Ms. Purple was pulled into an alley by a group of masked men who raped her repeatedly, and
threatened to kill her. The IJ found that the attack on Ms. Purple “was an instance of ordinary
crime not political persecution.”488 Ms. Yellow received a protective order from the Guatemalan
Police. Her abusive husband violated the order and brutally beat and “raped her twice in the
street.” The IJ determined that these acts of violence constituted “a crime or violation of an
order, not a ground for protection.” Ms. Orange was harassed and physically beaten by Mara 18
gang members. On one occasion a gang member attempted to force her to have sex with him.
When she protested, he pushed her against a wall, threw himself against her, “grabbed between
her thighs, and kissed her.”489 The IJ ruled that “the incident the Respondent suffered is not
sufficiently ‘extreme’” to constitute persecution, rather she was a “victim of opportunity and
generalized criminal activity.”490
Viewing rape and sexual assault as “criminal acts”—not grounds for a showing of
persecution—disregards the realities of Guatemalan history and society. How do Immigration
Judges frame their decisions? How do they come to the conclusion that the harm is not grave
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enough to rise to the level of persecution? The answer is coded in understandings of Guatemalan
women as sexual objects.
The immigration judge in Ms. Garcia-Martinez’s case ruled that gang rape could not
provide a well-founded fear of persecution, because Ms. Garcia-Martinez could not prove that
anyone “would have any present interest [in her] whatsoever.”491 Further, the IJ erred in
describing a central fact of Ms. GM’s case. Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez was gang raped. The
judge however repeatedly referred to the action as involving only a single attacker (“a soldier,”
“the individual that attacked her.”)492 The judge’s decision entirely distorted Ms. Martinez’
experience. He described actions of a soldier—not multiple soldiers— who acted outside of his
military role, in an isolated act of rape. The judge's misattribution ignores the extensive history
of gang rape as a weapon of war by the Guatemalan military.
Ms. Purple could not identify her masked attackers. The IJ subsequently determined that
Ms. Purple could not prove the “motives for their attacks.”493 The judge speculated that the
attackers chose Ms. Purple at random, rendering their actions criminal and not persecutory. The
IJ in Ms. Yellow’s case focused exclusively on the existence of her protective order. The judge
decided that her husband‘s repeated abusive acts constituted a criminal violation of the protective
order. Ms. Yellow was denied asylum because the IJ determined that she had already been
granted sufficient protection. Finally, the IJ in Ms. Orange’s case specifically evaluated the gang
violence and determined that the actions did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ informed
Ms. Orange that persecution “does not encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair,
unjust, or even unlawful.”494 In the IJ’s perspective, Ms. Orange:
491

Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11589.
Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11589.
493
Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2775.
494
CGRS Database Case No. 28816 (June 2019).
492

126
Only suffered bruises. She never required medical attention and does not allege to have
suffered any lasting injury. Additionally, despite the constant harassment, Respondent
was never actually forced to carry out any tasks for the gangs. Further, while any form of
sexual assault or harassment is offensive, the incident Respondent's suffered is not
sufficiently ‘extreme’ to rise to the level of persecution. […] Although Respondent was
kissed and touched inappropriately, she managed to run away and was not raped.495
If Ms. Orange was raped by her attackers would the IJ conclude that this abuse was “sufficiently
extreme”? The judge’s decision reveals that in his view, meeting the standard of persecution
requires visible injuries. In these cases, all four women faced an insurmountable obstacle.
Beyond convincing the judge of the violence they endured, they also had to penetrate preexisting biases about the significance and gravity of gender-based violence perpetrated against
Guatemalan women.

The Private vs. Public Sphere
The judges in the cases of Ms. Orange, Ms. Yellow, and Ms. Purple ruled that the gender
violence suffered by the women did not constitute persecution, because the violence was private,
personal, criminal, and/or insufficiently severe. Their analysis elides the fact that gender-based
violence is rooted in colonial history and now firmly planted within the Guatemalan social
structure. Gender-based violence is considered a lesser crime in Guatemala, and the military and
gangs use gender violence as a means to terrorize a community and maintain control.
The immigration judge’s ruling that denied Ms. Garcia Martinez’ asylum provides
evidence of this problem. In Ms. Garcia Martinez’ case, the judge focused exclusively on the
events that occurred inside Ms. Garcia-Martinez’ home, and did not acknowledge the soldiers’
systematic use of gang rape in the village as a campaign of extreme violence and misogyny. The
army’s actions were public and political, even if the physical act occurred in the home. By
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sidelining the actions of the Guatemalan military, the judge inaccurately assigned her suffering to
the private sphere.
Worse still, the judge failed to acknowledge the public and political nature of this crime
by attributing the rape to an apolitical motive: the soldier’s desire “to be with a woman.”496 This
perspective fully and erroneously placed the rape into the private sphere of sexual desire, while
ignoring the glaringly public motives behind the assault. The immigration judge perpetuated the
myth that “rape is just forceful sex by men who cannot control themselves’ [when] in reality
‘rape is not about sex; it is about power and control.”497 Allison Reimann argues that petitioners
for asylum based on gendered violence suffer in the immigration courts from “discursive
positioning as private subjects,” and the belief that sexual violence cannot be related to larger
political issues.498 Reframing the legal lens recapitulates the paternalistic actions of the United
States vis a vis the Guatemalan people.
The distortion of public and private sphere occurs frequently in cases of intimate partner
violence. The courts often interpret abuse that occurs within the home as occurring within the
private sphere; as a result, attorneys face challenges not only to criminalize the abusers’ actions,
but also to show the violence meets the nebulous definition of persecution. This can be an
insurmountable problem for Guatemalan women, because, as I have shown, levels of impunity
for intimate partner violence are extraordinarily high in the country. In the cases of Ms.
Cifuentes and others, the Guatemalan Police refused to respond to reports of domestic violence,
because they do not intervene in a marital relationship.499 Both Ms. Alvarado and Ms. Cifuentes
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had to prove the violence they endured was persecution on the basis of an enumerated ground.
Because the violent abuse was considered private, the women had to realign their narratives
within the public sphere. To represent the actions as public, both women focused on their
inability to leave the relationship, rather than the events that occurred within it. Both Ms.
Alvarado and Ms. Cifuentes recast their stories so that they appeared weak, lacking in agency:
“unable to leave.” They were eventually granted asylum; others, such as Ms. White, were not so
successful.
Ms. White was abused by her domestic partner who threatened to kill her and her son.
The court determined that these actions were not persecutory because of the circumstances of
their relationship. The judge defined the abuse as criminal and “apparently meted out against
[Ms. White] for [her husband’s] own personal reasons.”500 Because abuse must be proved on a
basis of greater concern (read: public concern), rather than “incidental, tangential, superficial, or
subordinate to another reason” the judge ruled that Ms. White failed to establish sufficient
harm.501 The judge found that her husband committed the abuse as a means of intimidation and
to maintain control within the home. Therefore, the abuse was committed by a “private actor”
and motivated by a “private concern.” Ms. White was denied asylum. Ms. Alvarado, Ms. GarciaMartinez, Ms. Cifuentes, and Ms. White all struggled to overcome distorted perceptions of
violence as occurring within the private sphere.

Establishing Nexus
Guatemalan women experience particular challenges in proving the motivation behind
their abusers’ actions, necessary to establish the nexus between their protected ground and the
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defined acts of persecution. Rody Alvarado first attempted to prove nexus by providing Osorio’s
statements: through direct testimony, and through the submission of evidence of Osorio’s
actions. The first BIA decision reasoned that the intense intimate partner violence was not
considered persecution because the evidence demonstrated that Osorio did not harm other
women.502 Ms. Alvarado was his only victim; therefore, the abuse could not have been connected
to her membership in the group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination.”503
The BIA determined that she did not meet the nexus requirement because her husband had not
“shown an interest” in other Guatemalan women, nor were other women “at risk of harm.”504 In
response, Ms. Alvarado’s legal team attempted to reposition her statement, asserting the abuse
was motivated by Ms. Alvarado’s political opinion “to live a violence-free life.” However, the
BIA disagreed that Ms. Alvarado’s intention constituted a political opinion, replicating the logic
that she was the sole victim. In Ms. Alvarado’s case, the BIA created a dangerous precedent:
dismissing intimate partner violence as a less extreme form of violence, unworthy of asylum
protection, simply because of the marital relationship between the perpetrator and the survivor.
Next, Ms. Alvarado attempted to explain the motivation through her own reasoning and
interpretation of her experience. Ms. Alvarado testified,
[Osorio] had been mistreated when he was in the army and, as he had told her, he treated
her the way he had been treated. […] He harmed her, when he was drunk and when he
was sober, for not getting an abortion, for his belief that she was seeing other men, for not
having her family get money for him, for not being able to find something in the house,
for leaving a cantina before him, for leaving him, for reasons related to his mistreatment
in the army, and “for no reason at all.”505

502

In Re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA, June 11, 1999, AG, January 19, 2001).
Ibid.
504
Ibid.
505
Ibid.
503

130
In response to this litany of harms, the BIA determined that the abuse was arbitrary. Mr. Osorio
abused Ms. Alvarado often, and without a clear cause. Instead of comprehending Ms. Alvarado’s
assertion that she was abused for “no reason at all”--as a signifier for the relentless abuse—the
BIA determined that the violence was senseless. Ms. Alvarado failed to establish nexus.
The IJs in the cases of Ms. Cifuentes and Ms. Black also found these women’s
explanations unsatisfactory. The IJ determined that although the abuse Ms. Cifuentes survived
was “unconscionable,” the abuse happened with great frequency, which normalized the abuse.506
The IJ considered Ms. Black, who was raped by ex-guerillas, the victim of “random criminal
violence” because of her inability to explain why she was “selected” as the victim.507 The IJ
determined that the men attacked Ms. Black because they were “looking for money and food."508
Without documentation, Ms. Black could not sway the IJ’s determination that the attack was
arbitrary. In my view, the word choice “selected” undermines the judge's position that the abuse
was “random.” Because Ms. Alvarado, Ms. Cifuentes, and Ms. Black were unable to definitively
prove motivation, the extreme abuse they experienced became separated from any protected
ground. The courts viewed their abuse either as ordinary or as arbitrary, allowing the judges to
rule against asylum.
Ms. Grey relied on specific evidence to establish an explanation for the abuse. Two
masked men raped Ms. Grey in retribution for her husband’s political position as an exguerilla.509 To prove this motive and establish nexus, Ms. Grey provided documentation
substantiating her husband’s role during the Civil War. The masked men told Ms. Grey that they
were looking for her husband; they mentioned him by name. Ms. Grey also provided evidence
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that a group of masked men had been following her for approximately three years.510 The court
concluded that this evidence established that the “masked men wanted information.” An attack
for the purpose of eliciting information is considered criminal, not persecutory. The court
determined that Ms. Grey’s rape did not have a connection to a protected ground.511
In these cases, the asylum seekers attempted to prove a connection between the violence
they experienced and one of the five grounds. All of these women met great obstacles. These
complexities develop from the restrictive parameters within asylum law, that require women to
prove the source of harm, and also provide a reason for this harm. The bar is high. Is there any
explanation that meets credibility from the perspective of the immigration courts? Actions of this
nature are rooted in the need to establish power, to assert a form of control that reflects the
colonial and patriarchal practices of the United States policies toward Guatemala. The
immigration system attempts to frame the demand to provide an explanation for abuse as an
aspect of the legal provision of nexus. In practice, proving nexus places an unimaginable burden
on women who are already victims.

Credibility
Guatemalan women must respond to preconceived ideas about how they will perform in
court in order to establish their credibility. In one case, the judge characterized Ms. Maroon’s
testimony as “vague, meager, and inconsistent” in both substance and style.512 His evaluation of
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Ms. Maroon’s vocal pattern grounded the judge’s conclusion that her allegations were false. The
judge implied that if she truly had been raped repeatedly by her domestic partner, she would
have presented her testimony with more clarity and vigor. Instead, the Judge focuses on the
discrepancies in her responses to questions about her children and derives a lack of credibility
from the fact that Ms. Maroon gave her children her husband’s last name.513 Ms. Brown faced a
similar obstacle when she tried to overcome the judge’s preconceived ideas about the assault she
endured. The judge first identified Ms. Brown as a woman with a “strong personality and
physical demeanor.”514 However, the judge determined she was not credible because she “failed
to directly answer the questions she was asked.”515 Her failure to answer questions in a direct
manner did not align with the judge’s expectations for clarity, or his preconceptions about her
character.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the Guatemalan cultural stigma surrounding
sexualized violence. As reviewed in Chapter 2, women rarely spoke about rape following the
Civil War. The Commission for Historical Clarification struggled to find women willing to
discuss the details of their traumatic experiences—due to cultural stigma surrounding sexual
violence, and a culture propensity to endure in silence. Although the desire to keep experiences
of sexualized violence private predated the asylum cases in this data set, the legacy persists.
Rather than recognize that both trauma and culture impact a victim’s ability to respond to direct
questions with clarity, judge’s “audience” this hesitation as uncertainty, or even deception.516
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Minor changes in a woman’s testimony may create a similar outcome. In a 2017 case, the
BIA concluded that Ms. Aqua lacked credibility on the basis of two inconsistencies in her
testimony:
During her interview with the asylum officer, [Ms. Aqua] said that on March 19, 2013,
two men on motorcycles shot at her at a town fair, but during the hearing before the IJ,
[Ms. Aqua] testified that her ex-husband XXX (name redacted) beat and tried to kill her
outside of a church on that day; and during her interview with the asylum officer, [Ms.
Aqua] said that she was on her way back from shopping when she found a young girl
hanged, but before the IJ, [Ms. Aqua] testified that she was on her way home from work,
and that the girl had been tied up with wire and shot several times.517
Because Ms. Aqua reported her observations of the murdered girl differently, four years after the
event, the judges found that she was not credible. The BIA did not acknowledge that Ms. Aqua
testified at both her AO interview and IJ hearing using a court-assigned interpreter. Subtle
differences in interpretation may have resulted in these minor discrepancies.
In “audiencing” Ms. Coral’s case, the judge masked his perceptions about Guatemalan
women by stressing the insufficiency of the evidence produced. The judge determined that the
presented reports were “inconsistent” and lacked specificity.518 Ms. Coral submitted a
Guatemalan police report to the court.519 As her asylum proceedings continued, the court
discovered a different copy of the police report, dated a few days later.520 In the judge’s view,
this minor discrepancy rendered the evidence inadmissible. The judge deemed other documents
insufficient because they contained the statement: “this is not a translation of the entire original
document. The translator has extracted the more important information from the original
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document.”521 In the judge’s perspective, the redaction diminished the value of the documents-to the extreme. The judge determined the documents were fraudulent.
These decisions suggest cultural bias. Language barriers should not influence a judge’s
determination that a woman does or does not deserve protection. Ms. Coral’s marriage license
included the same statement of redaction; the judge decided that he could not determine if she
was married. Without documentation of marriage, Ms. Coral lacked a PSG. Ms. Coral did not
merit protection because the court doubted her truth. Time elapsed and language barriers may
explain a survivor’s difficulties in articulating trauma, and their inconsistent testimony. When
judges fail to account for these human variables, they have lost objectivity.
In the most extreme cases, the survivor is presented as a liar, who intends to deceive the
court. Ms. Brown’s case provides an example.522 In his decision, the IJ concluded that “[t]he
marital relationship is intensely personal and complicated. Allegations of spousal abuse
compound the complexity. Because asylum proceedings are ex parte it is difficult and sometimes
impossible for an immigration judge to ascertain the veracity of domestic violence allegations
made by [an applicant] against his or her spouse.”523 The judge wrote his decision within a cloud
of misogyny. Instead of examining the facts of the case—police reports and documentation of
the Rio Negro massacre—the judge focused on his subjective views on the institution of
marriage. He stated that there was no “corroborating evidence” to warrant the conclusion that she
belonged to the PSG of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the
relationship.”524 Although Ms. Brown submitted documentation of the police reports, widely
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considered substantive, this evidence was ignored in his court. The judge concluded that her
allegations were “unsubstantiated and frankly implausible.”525
This judge’s determination is not extraordinary. In the case of Ms. Silver, the IJ declared
the asylum seeker unreliable because she “exaggerated her claim” during the trial.526 The IJ came
to this conclusion based on a disbelief that her partner raped her—thinking that this action was
out of the realm of possibility.527 In a 2007 case, Ms. Maroon testified that she survived multiple
episodes of rape by her partner, beginning at the age of 12 or 13. The IJ’s grossly insensitive
disposition was revealed in a series of rhetorical questions suggesting Ms. Maroon’s claims were
dubious:
Now, how do I know this was not a consensual arrangement? Unfortunately, on occasion
people lie. And even in this country young ladies who had arrangements with other
boyfriends later charged them with rape. And in some cases innocent boys are sent to jail
because the lady changed her mind. How do I know that this is not the incident in your
case? How do I know that you're not making up this story? […] there's reasons [sic] for
you to misstate the facts, because you want to stay here and there's no other way that you
can stay here unless you make up a story. Now, how do I know, do I have anything other
than your statement that you claim that you were raped by this young man in
Guatemala?528
The judge sided with the “innocent” man, who wasn’t present. Using his power to “audience”
Ms. Maroon’s testimony, the judge belittled her as a “young lady.” This articulation showcases
the depth of prejudice held by some asylum judges, who are willing to disregard evidence and
testimony because of a supposition that the history of violence is false. The judge in Ms.
Maroon’s case implies that she “made up a story” to leverage the sympathy of the U.S. court.
Finally, judges have also written decisions that reveal preconceived ideas about
femininity. Ms. Gold’s judge described her demeanor as “forthright” and “respectful” to her
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attorney.529 Because Ms. Gold respected her lawyer, a person of greater authority and education,
she met the judge‘s expectations of how a woman should behave, recalling traditional, colonial
understandings of women as quiet and docile. In a seeming contradiction of perspectives, women
must also meet Westernized expectations of an expansive, emotional performance when
describing the gravity of their abuse. Women must also avoid becoming too emotional, falling
into the risk of becoming labeled “hysterical” or “unruly.” Guatemalan women are caught within
the confines of subjective expectations, with their lives at risk.
Framing Gender-Based Violence as Pervasive
A final obstacle arises when the asylum seeker attempts to establish the failure of the
Guatemalan government to protect them. As noted above, prior to addressing this challenge, the
asylum seeker must have proven already that the harm warrants public attention—outside of a
private relationship. To transcend this final obstacle, asylum seekers commonly rely on
individual testimony and country conditions evidence. Country conditions documentation is an
essential part of the asylum process.
In my analysis of the 24-case data set, the attorneys’ reports submitted to the immigration
officials centered around the levels of violence against women in contemporary Guatemala,
including: femicide statistics, reports from the Specialized Courts, and specific data about
women’s role in society. Although providing this evidence is an essential part of the process,
framing gender-based violence as pervasive in Guatemala allows for paradoxical decisions. The
Guatemala country conditions normalize violence against women. A judge may reason that
asylum is reserved for special victims in particular circumstances. Country-based evidence
allows U.S judges to find women’s trauma unexceptional. Because the judge interprets the
529
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violence as pervasive, they can offer a rebuttal to the asylum seekers claims for protection. The
survivor of gender-based violence may be deserving of sympathy, but not asylum. The framing
of violence as ubiquitous in Guatemala also allows the U.S. to act as the paternal protector—
while avoiding culpability.

Rebutting Persecution, Deemphasizing Individual Harm
Rebuttals to asylum claims take different approaches. First, Immigration officials may
assert that political and societal conditions in Guatemala have transformed in ways that would
protect the claimant. In a 2004 case, the judge determined that the end of the Civil War marked
such a transformation. This judge cited U.S. State Department reports that determined the
conclusion of the War signaled a decrease in violence. This judge ruled that the asylum seeker
would not face harm if deported to Guatemala.530 In this case, the judge disregarded evidence of
continuous violence.
Second, officials may argue that there is a marginal probability of future abuse. For
example, an asylum seeker who came to the United States to escape her abusive husband argued
changed circumstances. Her husband had followed her to the U.S., but was deported back to
Guatemala by ICE.531 The court claimed that the fact that he had followed her to the U.S.
demonstrated a negligible probability of future abuse because there was no evidence that he tried
to harm her while they both lived outside of Guatemala. The IJ doubted the asylum seeker’s
testimony that her abuser threatened to kill her if she returned to Guatemala.532
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Third, immigration officials cite country conditions reports to justify returning the
applicant to Guatemala. In Ms. Black’s case, the IJ determined that the Guatemalan government
would protect the asylum seeker from future gang violence; they recommended that she relocate
within Guatemala to access the protections available, including the Specialized Courts for
Violence Against Women.533 The IJ did not address the ineffectiveness of this institution. The
judge concluded that Ms. Black’s mother and sister live in another part of Guatemala and have
not reported experiencing harm. This ruling did not address the levels of gang violence
throughout the country. An analysis of asylum decisions by the Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies found that few cases reach a conclusion about “safe and reasonable relocation options for
women in their home countries.”534 However, immigration officials continue to use this loophole
to frame their rebuttal.
Finally, immigration officials who must address country conditions that establish
constant violence within Guatemalan society may respond by downgrading the experience of the
individual claimant. The violence is normalized. In 2015, one immigration judge ruled that the
country conditions evidence was the only permissible exhibit in the case.535 The judge
recognized that Guatemala “experiences significant societal problems related to domestic
violence…” but general country conditions evidence “does not corroborate the respondent‘s
specific claim of mistreatment by her domestic partner.”536 Two years later, a different
immigration judge came to a similar conclusion. After receiving reports of sexual and physical
gang violence against women, the judge responded that Ms. Coral “was the victim of opportunity
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and of generalized criminal activity.” Although the IJ concluded that the country conditions
evidence proved that “gang related violence in particular remains a prevalent concern in
Guatemala,” he found nothing in the woman’s testimony to establish that “she faces an
appreciably different risk from those faced by the general population.”537
In both cases, the IJs used country conditions evidence to “render [their] past harm
indistinct.”538 Recasting intense violence and deeply personal trauma as universal demeans the
victim. The U.S. government’s power to rewrite the asylum seeker’s personal narrative is
troubling, especially when the revision denies or diminishes the victim‘s authentic experience.
The government’s ability to discredit the asylum seeker’s history validates the existing power
structure.
Part III: Conclusion: The Legacies of Colonialism—Paternalism, “True Womanhood,” and
Gaslighting
The problems of defining an enumerated ground, proving persecution, establishing nexus,
meeting credibility standards, and working within a system that has labeled violence as
pervasive—all connect to the paternalistic nature of the asylum system. From a position of
imbalanced power, the United States immigration courts establish who deserves protection.
The phrase “unable to leave” limits the options of Guatemalan women asylum seekers.
The U.S. Government’s Department of Homeland Security proposed the “unable to leave”
particular social group. DHS established—though in a veiled manner—a provision that required
Ms. Alvarado to frame her story to highlight her lack of ability. The Matter of A-R-C-G- and The
Matter of R-A-, the two cases that set the precedent for this particular social group, marked great
progress for gender-based asylum; however, these decisions have informed a specific
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understanding of Guatemalan women asylum seekers, and more generally women from the
developing world. The U.S. government sees Guatemalan women as humans of “differential
humanity” who are weak, powerless, and fragile.539 When Guatemalan women fall outside of this
conceptualization, they risk safety and protection.
In Ms. Red’s case, the Judge determined that she was deserving of asylum because “she
wanted to leave” but was “helpless to do so.” Nowhere in the record does the respondent use the
word “helpless.” To the contrary, she described traveling two hours from her home to file a
police report, physically standing between her husband and her children when he attempted to
abuse them, and reporting violations of her protective order to police.540 Ms. Red confronted her
husband on many occasions. She was “able.” The judge inserts the word helpless in order to
provide a legal justification for granting her the asylum status she deserved. These linguistic
acrobatics reflect a paternalistic asylum system. The women who successfully navigate this legal
mess spend significant time in limbo. Women who pass through the procedural hurdles of the
asylum system must swallow their pride, give up self-respect, admit their inferiority and
weakness, deny their agency, and hope for an understanding and benevolent judge. Guatemalan
women must adjust to the paternalistic asylum system in order to survive within it.
The action of DHS to centralize the term “unable” amplifies perceptions of Guatemalan
women’s inferiority, which reflects colonialism. Further, the establishment of “unable to leave”
has given individual judges the latitude to use similar stereotypes in their decisions. The category
of inability plays into perceptions of Third World women as inferior. Chandra Mohanty explains
that the stereotype of the Third World woman produces two constraints. She is “sexually
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constrained” by her femininity, and further “constrained by being ‘third world’ (read: ignorant,
poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.).”541 The use of
the term “unable” shackles Guatemalan women and plays into the “matrices of power” entwined
with the legacy of colonization.542
By requiring women to define and prove persecution, immigration judges and the asylum
system enact paternalistic control. Requiring women to prove sufficient harm, or viewing the
violence they endured as “private”, demonstrates the concept of differential humanity. The
colonial history of Guatemala assigns “differential worth” to different human bodies. The
Guatemalan woman is of less “worth” than the Guatemalan man.
On the individual level of the asylum-seeker, the system re-victimizes the woman.
Women’s experiences are evaluated for credibility, sufficiency, and particularity. Judges
scrutinize their personal lives; then they assess, and, often, criticize their character. The most
personal details of their lives are forced into the open, repeatedly and with specific restrictions,
all in order to prove their worth. Not only must she tell and retell to establish “credibility,” for
legal reasons, she must often frame the retelling within the paternalistic parameters of “unable.”
A. Cheree Carlson, a rhetoric professor focused on law, explains that this expectation is “derived
from years of exposure to preexisting narratives.”543
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Carlson argues the narrative expectations placed on women in the legal system are based
on the virtues of “True Womanhood.”544 The feminine is characterized by “submissiveness” and
“domesticity.”545 Carlson contends that what happens in a courtroom reflects prevailing ideas
about the character of women. Non-citizens—Guatemalan women asylum seekers—are expected
to present narratives that fall in line with the U.S. notion of womanhood (i.e. True Womanhood).
Simultaneously, they must present narratives that correspond to the U.S. political understanding
of the asylum seekers’ country of origin.546 By asserting discretionary privilege, asylum judges
make decisions based on their assessment of a Guatemalan women’s worth. Judges rely on their
subjective perspectives to determine how women should act within the courtroom, what
constitutes violence, and how to properly display femininity. Enforcing these expectations—
while compelling the use of narrative, and doubting credibility—is a distortion of power.
On a system level, the approach to a Guatemalan woman’s claims can be viewed as
gaslighting on a grand scale. As I have shown previously, a judge’s ability to determine that
sexual violence is not a significant harm can be traced back to the earliest days of colonialism.
Colonizers used sexual violence as a strategy to control the colonized race.547 Lynn Stephen
explains: “Indigenous women have been projected as ‘available’ to outsiders and invading
military forces.”548 Sexual violation was a powerful tool of colonization, terrorizing women
physically while also exerting control over colonized men, who were rendered powerless to
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protect and defend their families. Over time, the systemic sexual objectification of women
facilitates ambivalence toward sexual violence, even among the colonized.
Positioning gender-based violence as pervasive within Guatemala allows for a crucial act
of paternalism. This position, exaggerated by the complete lack of acknowledgement of the
history between the U.S. and Guatemala, facilitates the applications of labels of superiority and
inferiority. In the review of all twenty-four case documents, the only record that referenced the
U.S. role in Guatemala was a legal brief submitted by an attorney. This is not surprising.
However, the effect of the lack of acknowledgment is significant. First, judges may focus on the
levels of violence in Guatemala, and label gender-based violence as apolitical, ordinary, and
undeserving of protection. Next, judges may shift their perspective: the violence becomes
political but located specifically in Guatemala. Judges either construct asylum seekers from the
“Third World” as “unworthy claimants” or they are “begging to be saved from tyranny of their
own cultures, communities, and men.”549 This ignores history and denies the responsibility the
U.S. bears, as a colonist, for the extreme gender violence and impunity about that violence
within in Guatemala.
The case of Ms. Yellow illustrates this argument. After the first hearing, the IJ denied the
asylum claim, labeling the interpersonal violence criminal and not persecutory. The IJ concluded
that Ms. Yellow lacked membership in a particular social group because she was “able to leave”
the relationship. The IJ viewed the violence as personal, unique to the woman’s experience, and
undeserving of protection. A few years later, Ms. Yellow appealed the decision to the BIA. The
Board did not comment specifically on her experience of violence. Rather, the BIA remanded the
case to an immigration judge for further proceedings regarding the country conditions. Almost
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two years after the initial hearing, the immigration judge granted Ms. Yellow asylum and made
the sweeping claim that “Guatemala continues to facilitate domestic and sexual violence.” The
violence became political, and specifically located within Guatemala. In this final declaration,
Ms. Yellow’s partner was not defined as the primary actor of abuse. The statement placed the
country of Guatemala at fault. Ms. Yellow was granted asylum.
This was a good outcome for Ms. Yellow, personally, but it is accomplished by finding
interpersonal violence as essential to the “values, beliefs, and rituals of the people living in these
countries and in the region.”550 Defining violence as endemic to Guatemala without
acknowledging U.S. complicity is an analytical sleight of hand available to a colonial power. The
U.S. creates a “rhetoric of absence,”551 distancing itself from any connection to gendered
violence. Localizing the abuse within the borders of Guatemala paints the Third World woman
as “always in danger” and the violence as a “natural fact experienced by particular bodies in
particular places of the world.”552
In evaluating an asylum claim, the U.S. evades responsibility, plays the paternal
protector, and advances colonial notions of Western superiority. By elevating notions of
authority, the U.S. conveniently forgets its role as a “violent participant,” instead positioning its
role as the civil, decent, “detached outside observer.” 553 This freedom from responsibility allows
U.S. immigration officials to admit “deserving” women asylum seekers through activating their
role as defenders, and, often, by positioning women as “unable”. Once gender-based violence
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becomes understood as pervasive, the U.S. assumes the role of absolute protector—controlling
the process at every step of the way.554
When the asylum system views gender violence as a lesser harm, it replicates the idea
that Guatemalan women are of lesser worth. When the asylum system requires Guatemalan
women to provide a reason for their abuse, it ignores the colonial history from which the
gendered violence arose. When U.S. asylum officers or immigration judges dismiss the gendered
sexual violence as insignificant, exaggerated, doubtful, or insufficient evidence of persecution,
they essentially recapitulate the colonialism and ignore or rewrite history. And when
immigration officials grant asylum, they may require the Guatemalan woman to frame her claim
in a way that privileges the opinion of the judge over the experience of the survivor, allowing
U.S. to avoid responsibility, and act as a paternalistic hero—a person of greater worth.

554

Sara L. McKinnon, Gendered Asylum: Race and Violence in U.S. Law and Politics, 30. Eithne Luibhéid, Entry
Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border, 113.

146
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between the United States and Guatemala is built on a paternalistic
power system that extends back many decades. The asylum system reproduces this unequal
power dynamic through immigration officials’ evaluations of individual cases. This chapter
extends the paternalistic issues present in the asylum cases of Guatemalan women to broader
injustices in the immigration system, as well as anti-immigrant sentiment in U.S. society. Within
this conclusion, I offer possible changes to promote greater justice for asylum seekers.
The Trump Administration has heightened levels of prejudice against immigrants,
amplified further against immigrant women from the developing world. New regulations and
legal structures have rendered the asylum system ineffective. This reality is not unique to our
time; the United States has faced other periods of strict nativism. The unjust application of
humanitarian rights is rooted in the intention to sustain power. The United States maintains
power and control through government officials and agencies, media outlets, and appeals to the
general public utilizing rhetoric that centralizes the fear of overwhelming the U.S. with a
“flood”555 of immigrants.
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Invoking the “Fear of the Floodgates”
In 1939, the President of Cuba turned away the St. Louis, a ship carrying 937 German
Jewish refugees. The St. Louis was denied permission to dock on the shores of Havana.556
Desperate, the ship’s Captain appealed to the U.S. government, which also declined the ship
entry. Patrolling the waters, the U.S. Coast Guard prevented any passengers from swimming to
safety on U.S. shores. The ship returned to Europe. Hundreds of Jewish refugees on board were
murdered during the Holocaust. Absorbing the hateful sentiments of World War II ideology,
liberal and conservative-minded people argued that the immigration system faced two futures:
either the U.S. maintained a zero-tolerance policy, or the “floodgates” opened to all entries.557
This rhetoric is reflected in contemporary conversations about immigration. This “fear” informs
paternalistic views of controlling entry, disregarding safety and humanitarian commitments.
In 1991, a group of religious and refugee advocacy organizations filed a class action
lawsuit, ABC v. Thornburgh, against Immigration and Naturalization Services (now USCIS), the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the U.S. Department of State, on behalf of
Central American refugees.558 The plaintiffs, a group of Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees,
alleged that immigration officials acted with adjudicatory bias when rendering decisions in their
asylum claims.559 The government agreed to settle, in recognition of bias. The settlement
agreement states: “The same standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a wellfounded fear of persecution applies to Salvadorans and Guatemalans as [it] applies to all other
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nationalities.”560 Despite the settlement agreement, prejudiced trends continue, especially in
regard to the asylum claims of women.
As asylum advocates fought for the rights of women refugees, a national response began
to call for limitations, raising the specter of the incoming “flood.” Anti-immigrant forces
renewed the invocation of “the floodgates” following the case of Fauziya Kassindja, who was
granted asylum because she faced female genital mutilation in her home county. Millions of
women seek to avoid or suffer the consequences of female genital cutting every year.561
Immigration opponents felt that granting Ms. Kassindja asylum would lead immigrant women to
overwhelm the asylum system. The detractors raised the fear of “the floodgates” with greater
fervor during Rody Alvarado’s long battle with the immigration system.
Asylum attorney and advocate Karen Musalo explains that this fear has a gendered
component; it is “disproportionally raised in the context of women’s asylum claims on the basis
of gendered violence” (emphasis added).562 In my view, this concern derives from an aversion to
the specific and frequently sexual nature of women’s asylum claims. By denying the reality and
truth of women’s lived experience, misogynistic approaches dismiss the claims as “feminine”
and invalid.
The usage of the word “floodgates” has particular resonance as applied to immigrants
who are women. The word “flood” conjures the image of an uncontrollable, vast, and dangerous
amount of water overwhelming the land. The Bible describes a flood so severe that it nearly
destroyed all of humankind. Floods are considered environmental disasters, a catastrophe that
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governments must address. Positioning this idea in reference to women seeking safety in the
United States suggests “swells” or “waves” of entries: waves of immigration that are
dangerous—and risk the “demise” of established government.563
When applied to immigrant women, the “floodgates” metaphor signifies “the power and
the threat of the feminine.”564 Sara McKinnon takes this metaphor a step further, suggesting that
“flood” and “flow” symbolize menstruation, a “dark” and mysterious force, repellent and
threatening to men.565 Comparing immigrant women to concepts of darkness emphasizes the fear
of the Third World woman as someone of “differential humanity.”566
Anti-immigration thought and rhetoric with regards to women include fears about
reproduction and changing what it means to be an American. The metaphor of “flow” and
“flooding”—by alluding to menstruation—references this fear of women’s reproductive place as
immigrants.567 The flood metaphor ties together fears about women generally, with specific fears
about women immigrants—erroneously linking considerations of women seeking protection with
the danger of women “flowing” into the space. The language of the “floodgates” also implies
that women seeking asylum status on the basis of gendered violence are unexceptional; rather,
they are part of the “swell” of women seeking safety. The intensity and horrific nature of the
gendered violence they experienced is recast as ordinary.568 The “floodgates” argument de-
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emphasizes the experiences of unique human beings who have suffered extreme abuse and
focuses concern instead on the impact of immigration to the United States.
Opponents of gender-based asylum claims often use the “floodgates” argument to assert
that the United States will become overwhelmed if the “door” is opened.569 This concern allows
opponents to defend a closely held conviction. These challengers do not believe the women
refugees. The news media has disseminated the deniers’ viewpoint in publications over the last
two decades. In an interview with the Christian Monitor, Jack Martin, the FAIR570 Special
Projects Director, stated that it is unreasonable to expect U.S. immigration judges to evaluate
cases of “problems for women” in other countries. In his view, it would be too hard for them to
come to an “accurate assessment” of the interpersonal situations that should be considered
crimes, as opposed to national practices.571 This statement evokes the floodgates as code for his
actual belief that women who seek asylum fraudulently assert abuse. Anti-immigrant attorney
Dan Stein told CNN that he “feared the floodgates” would override the already backlogged
asylum system through deception:
[The asylum system is] barely keeping up with new claims [.] This new definition is a
magnet that draws people in illegally to try to take advantage of the system […]We
cannot bring people here simply because they are- are suffering under general cultural
forms of oppression, even though, you know, it's obviously a problem, it's not the way
we're going to solve it.572
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The fear of the floodgates and the connected assertion that women make gender-based
claims fraudulently underscore the essential flaws of the U.S. immigration system; the asylum
system requires women to surmount great hurdles, and immigration authorities often view cases
with prejudiced lenses in order to stop the incoming “flood.” Requiring women to reposition
their experiences to fit the confines of an enumerated ground, to establish the severity of their
abuse, and to provide a specific explanation for the motivation of their abusers are all actions the
asylum system takes to control the “flood.”
Attorney General Sessions' decision in the Matter of A-B- reflects the “floodgates”
concern in the Trump Administration’s anti-immigration policies, and has also intensified the
paternalistic problems that Guatemalan women face. AG Sessions’ June 2018 decision,
overturning the ruling in the Matter of A-R-C-G-, clarified the government’s position on asylum
claims for women fleeing interpersonal violence. AG Sessions wrote: “The mere fact that a
country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or
gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself
establish an asylum claim.”573 With this decision, the Trump Administration took a clear stance
against women seeking asylum. As this thesis has demonstrated, this position has a long history.
AG Sessions' position is rooted in decades of injustice practiced by the United States against
Central America.
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Recommendations: What change is possible?
The decisions within the twenty-four asylum cases evaluated in this research elucidate the
continuation of defining violence suffered by women in the “private sphere.” Domestic violence
is not private. Gender-based violence is not personal. Though these forms of brutality often occur
behind closed doors, violence against women must be understood as a public concern, a problem
of society. Gender-based violence arises from socialized power structures, where men control
women’s bodies and women learn they must submit to survive. European colonists forced onto
the Mayan world their notions of machismo and male dominance. In Guatemala, generations of
men learned brutality against women during the Civil War. U.S soldiers taught violence against
women as a weapon of war. The paradigm of asylum status develops from a system of
paternalism within the United States. This model positions the United States as a protector: the
U.S. establishes itself as a safe zone, a place of refuge from uncivilized violence. Gender-based
violence happens everywhere, in every country, including this one. Rectifying the asylum system
must begin with this recognition.
The United States government should commit to addressing this unjust system.
Immigration rights activists should direct U.S. officials to peer countries for recommendations on
how to address gender-based asylum claims. In 1993, Canada became the first nation to institute
country-specific guidelines for refugee women, largely based on actions of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The “Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution” had two primary goals: to heighten judges’ sensitivity to
the unique problems faced by refugee women, and to provide clear instructions for evaluating
women’s asylum and refugee claims.574 The Canadian government recognized that women are
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disadvantaged by the original definition of a “refugee.”575 The Canadian Guidelines responded
clearly to the frequent argument proposed by opponents that gender as a particular social group
is “too large” by stating: “the fact that the particular social group consists of large numbers of the
female population in the country concerned is irrelevant — race, religion, nationality and
political opinion are also characteristics that are shared by large numbers of people.”576 The
Guidelines stated clearly that gender-based violence constitutes persecution: “The fact that
violence against women, including sexual and domestic violence, is universal is irrelevant.”577
After establishing the Guidelines, Canada was the first country to develop clear case law that
defended the rights of women fleeing gender-based violence.578 In 2006, the Swedish
government passed the Swedish Aliens Act which changed the definition of a “refugee” to
include gender and sexual orientation. Other countries, including the United States, issued
guidelines reflective of both UNHCR and Canadian policy thereafter. Canada is one of the few
countries that has remained committed to these guidelines and at “numerous times reaffirmed its
commitment to the principle in both theory and practice.”579 The United States commitment is
insufficient—or empty.
In recent years, levels of immigration and asylum applications have reached crisis levels
worldwide. Studying the history and roots of injustice that are replicated within the asylum
system is imperative to understanding the current immigration crisis. I have focused specifically
on Guatemala, a single country in Central America, whose history reflects larger trends of U.S.
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colonial interference. United States intervention in Guatemala should be viewed as a “test case”
for U.S. involvement in other nations that are perceived as “inferior.” The United States was
deeply engaged in political realities that led to the Civil War in Guatemala, and U.S. armed
forces promoted the violence that endured for three decades. The implications of these actions—
and the research in this study—can be extended across Latin America.
At the broadest level, this thesis has explored the power systems that operate in today's
world. Modern U.S. asylum law undermines the principles of international asylum law that were
created, however imperfectly, after the global horrors of World War II. The international
principles established in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were designed for impartial
application, using a humanitarian lens to emphasize the needs of the individual refugee.
However, as nations have applied these principles, individual states have assumed the power to
make asylum decisions based on their own interests. When the United States implements policies
that disregard individual human suffering, the result has clear implications around the globe.
This study serves as a critique of global power relations, and the problems embedded in
paternalistic control. The United States asylum system evidences the harm that arises when
powerful nations grant themselves the authority to evaluate the needs of other human
populations. The gender-based asylum decisions analyzed in this thesis reveal how the U.S.
judicial system ignores history, demeans asylum seekers, and exercises imbalanced, paternalistic
power in its decision-making. The case law of Guatemalan women’s claims inscribes the
relationship between the United States and Guatemala.
In my view, the United States government should reinvent the process for women to
apply for asylum. The immigration system should set aside the artificial legal hurdles of
establishing a particular social group, and proving persecution and nexus. The asylum system
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should move away from positioning women as weak, powerless, or “unable” by establishing
clear definitions and just protocols. Paternalistic ideology controls who has permission to enter
the United States—who merits safety—and also controls how the asylum claim is framed by
immigration officials. The U.S. government, immigration officials, and the media should avoid
the rhetoric of “floodgates” and “loopholes”—and recognize instead the implications of the U.S.
interventions in Latin America. The U.S. government has a moral obligation to change the
asylum system. After decades of covert intimidation and direct involvement in instability and
violence, the United States government must address the continuing injustice that exists at the
border, in courtrooms and government offices, and in the language used to describe immigrants
and refugees.
The layers of injustice committed by the United States are continuous. The approach
taken in this thesis has collected, identified, and revealed the systemic nature of destructive
power by giving voice to narratives and creating space for histories that are untold. Collecting
and identifying the unremitting nature of this unequal power relationship compels activism. How
can the United States address our heritage as a country of immigrants—and our history of
paternalism in the developing world with authenticity? As Senator Bernie Sanders stated in the
February 25, 2020, South Carolina presidential debate: “It might be a good idea to be honest
about American foreign policy. That includes the fact that America has overthrown governments
all over the world in Chile, in Guatemala, in Iran."580 Senator Sanders’ confronts the duplicity of
U.S. actions, and suggests that authentic public conversations about the U.S. role in Latin
America are possible. Instead of creating a “flood” of fear, we must promote the truth by
emphasizing pieces of history that are often purposefully undisclosed or improperly cast aside.
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On November 21, 2019, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Representative Zoe
Lofgren of California introduced the bicameral Refugee Protection Act in the U.S. Congress.581
The Bill—which has been referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship—
outlines a plan to revise United States policy toward refugees and asylum seekers. The Refugee
Protection Act would establish protocols to minimize detention, define pathways to provide legal
counsel to immigrant children, and set an annual refugee admissions goal of at least 95,000
people—while placing a limit on presidential authority.582 Further, the Refugee Protection Act
lays out a plan to provide protection for women and girls fleeing gender-based violence. In
proposing the Bill, Senator Leahy explained: “The world faces the worst refugee crisis in
recorded history. The United States should be embracing our role as the humanitarian leader of
the world – not retreating from it.”583
The future of gender-based claims within the United States asylum system is at a critical
juncture. AG Sessions decision in the Matter of A-B- created devastating results for women
fleeing domestic violence, but the fight is not over. In December 2019, the Center for Gender
and Refugee Studies submitted an appeal to the Board addressing Ms. A.B.’s asylum eligibility.
In late March 2020, Attorney Blaine Bookey presented oral argument in a case of an asylum
seeker who was wrongly denied asylum in light of A-B-. Four more cases of gender-based
asylum cases have been appealed to the Ninth Circuit and will be heard in the upcoming weeks.
While legal advocates continue to argue in the courtrooms, President Trump upends the
immigration system without regard for the rule of law. Tonight, as I finish this year-long
research project, President Trump released this tweet: “In light of the attack from the Invisible
581

S.2936 - Refugee Protection Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
Ibid.
583
Office of United States Congresswoman, Zoe Lofgren, “Leahy & Lofgren Introduce Bicameral Refugee
Protection Act of 2019,” (November 21, 2019).
582

157
Enemy, as well as the need to protect the jobs of our GREAT American Citizens, I will be
signing an Executive Order to temporarily suspend immigration into the United States!” (7:06
PM April 20, 2020).584 The stakes are rising once again. The consequences of President Trump’s
latest threat to disregard human suffering is unknown. However, allies in the legal world will
continue to fight, and their commitment to justice must be mirrored in civil activism.
This thesis has centered the voices and experiences of those most effected by injustice,
and elevated the power of learning the complete truth. Activism supporting changes to the
asylum system should reflect the intention to confront historic and modern injustice. United
States history has shown the capacity to create genuine change when people begin to question
the systems of power operating around them. We must start with authentic education: the
dissemination of critical information that exposes the truth in order to create a generation of
informed U.S. citizens who accept their responsibility to advocate for the rights of all. To
achieve long-lasting structural change, advocates for immigration reform must mobilize broad
public support. This effort has already begun in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Cambridge;
these cities have passed resolutions that condemn the A-B- decision, and commit to protecting
survivors of gender-based violence who are seeking asylum. These resolutions reached local
governments following the dedicated work of community organizers calling for direct action.
Other cities and counties must follow.
After the Matter of A-B, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies began Immigrant
Women Too, a national movement dedicated to uplifting the stories of women asylum seekers in
the United States. This movement provides public spaces and online platforms for immigrant
survivors of gender-based violence to share their stories. Now, allies must work to spread these
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powerful testimonies, a direct action that will continue to spread truth and awareness. Armed
with a body of information about the brutal history of the U.S. relationship with Guatemala and
the region of Latin America, the labyrinthine asylum system, and a commitment to centering the
voices of survivors, we can fight against this time of sanctioned prejudice in our country and
across oceans. We have a moral responsibility to bring the United States back in line with
international humanitarian obligations for safety and justice.
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